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ABSTRACT
The ever increasing processing power of modern computers, as well as the increased
availability of large and complex data sets, has led to an explosion in machine learning
research. This has led to increasingly complex machine learning algorithms, such
as Convolutional Neural Networks, with increasingly complex applications, such as
malware detection.
Recently, malware authors have become increasingly successful in bypassing tra-
ditional malware detection methods, partly due to advanced evasion techniques such
as obfuscation and server-side polymorphism. Further, new programming paradigms
such as fileless malware, that is malware that exist only in the main memory (RAM)
of the infected host, add to the challenges faced with modern day malware detection.
This has led security specialists to turn to machine learning to augment their malware
detection systems. However, with this new technology comes new challenges. One of
these challenges is the need for interpretability in machine learning.
Machine learning interpretability is the process of giving explanations of a machine
learning model’s predictions to humans. Rather than trying to understand everything
that is learnt by the model, it is an attempt to find intuitive explanations which are
simple enough and provide relevant information for downstream tasks. Cybersecurity
analysts always prefer interpretable solutions because of the need to fine tune these
solutions. If malware analysts can’t interpret the reason behind a misclassification,
they will not accept the non-interpretable or “black box” detector.
In this thesis, we provide an overview of machine learning and discuss its roll in cy-
ber security, the challenges it faces, and potential improvements to current approaches
in the literature. We showcase its necessity as a result of new computing paradigms
by implementing a proof of concept fileless malware with JavaScript. We then present
techniques for interpreting machine learning based detectors which leverage n-gram
analysis and put forward a novel and fully interpretable approach for malware detec-
tion which uses convolutional neural networks. We also define a novel approach for
evaluating the robustness of a machine learning based detector.
vi
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Machine Learning has come a long way in recent years. There has been a vast
amount of papers published in the last decade which offer a number of substantial
improvements on machine learning algorithms both old and new. Along side this
research there has also been many papers which study the various applications of
machine learning algorithms. From perhaps the most well known, even among non-
experts, such as machine vision and natural language processing, to the less well
known but all the while pervasive and significant medical, commercial, and industrial
applications.
Machine learning is the study of algorithms which allow computers to preform a
specific task without the use of explicit programming. These algorithms accomplish
this by using statistics and inference techniques to detect or “learn” patterns within
data (hence machine learning is considered a type of pattern recognition). These
patterns are then used in various ways to preform a certain task.
The data used by the machine learning algorithm, referred to as the “data set”,
is typically a table where each row is considered a single record or “sample” and each
column corresponds to a “feature” whose values describe said feature for each sample
in the data set. For example, a housing market data set would have a separate row
for each house and a column for each feature, such as the number of rooms, square
footage, and so on. In practice, a data set of n samples and m features is an n ×m
array (table, matrix, etc.) of values where the ith row of the feature array gives the
“feature vector” of the ith sample. Meanwhile, the jth column in the ith row gives the
1
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value of the jth feature for the ith sample. This value is denoted denoted xi,j however
the row index i is omitted when the context makes it obvious we are discussing a
single example. The processes of choosing features and determining their value for
each sample are known as feature selection and feature extraction respectively. In
some cases, such as computer vision with neural networks, feature extraction is done
by the machine learning algorithm automatically from raw data such as images (e.g.
pixel RGB values).
Machine learning can be broadly separated into two categories, supervised and
unsupervised learning. In supervised learning, each sample is accompanied by a
“label”, and the 1 × n array of labels forms a column vector where the ith element,
denoted yi, is the label of the sample i
th sample. The machine learning algorithm
uses a subset of the data set, called the training set, in order to learn the relationship
between the feature values and the label. This learnt relationship is referred to as
“the model” and can be used to predict the label of previously unseen samples from
their feature values. However, before being used as a predictor, to ensure the model
is effective at making predictions, the trained model makes predictions on a portion
of the labeled data set which was left out during training, called the test set. The
predicted labels are compared with the known labels to see if the predictions are
reliable. What is considered reliable is application specific, and as we shall see later,
goes far beyond simple metrics such as accuracy.
Supervised learning can be further divided into two subcategories, regression and
classification. In the former case, the model predicts a real value such as a the price
a house will sell for. In the latter case, the model predicts a discrete value which
corresponds to the class of a sample. For example, in binary classification the model
may predict either 0 or 1 which may correspond to the rejection class or approval
class of mortgage applicants based on features extracted from financial histories.
In the case of unsupervised learning, samples in the data set are not accompanied
by labels and here the objective is to find unknown structure and relationships in the
data. Models trained using unsupervised learning can find anomalous data points or
uncover potential classes to be used later in a supervised approach. We hold off on a
2
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discussion of unsupervised machine learning techniques as they are not the focus of
this thesis.
Next we introduce a high level discussion of the machine learning models used
later in this thesis, specifically in Chapter 4. This will serve as a preliminary for
understanding what is discussed there for readers without a background in machine
learning.
1.1 Machine Learning Algorithms
One of the most basic and widely used machine learning algorithms is Linear Re-
gression. Linear Regression models are used for regression by simply calculating a
weighted sum of a sample’s feature values and adding a real valued “bias” which
yields it’s predicted label. The weight of the jth feature is denoted wj resulting in the




xjwj + β (1)
A version of Linear Regression adapted for binary classification is Logistic Regres-
sion in which the result of the sigmoid function applied to the weighted sum is used
to determine the label. Since the sigmoid function outputs only values between 0 and
1, a sample is predicted to belong to class 0 if it produces an output less than 0.5,
otherwise it is predicted to belong to class 1. In the case where there are more then
two classes, a Logistic Regression model is trained for each class. For the kth Logistic
Regression model, only the samples belong to the kth class are labeled 1 and the rest
are labeled 0. Thus the multi-class scenario is treated as multiple binary classification
scenarios. During prediction, a sample is predicted as the class whose Logistic Regres-
sion model produced the highest output. This is known as one-vs-rest classification.




where z is the result of equation 1 (2)
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So far we have seen how linear regression and logistic regression models make
predictions, but as of yet we have not discussed how they are trained. Before we can
do this we must introduce the idea of the “loss function”. The loss function provides
a measure of the error in a models predictions given a set of labeled samples and must
be differentiable with respect to the parameters of the model which we wish to learn.
Here parameters refers to any values which we learn during training, such as feature
weights and the bias. (Values which are not learnt during training and are chosen
before hand are called hyper-parameters.) When we say “differentiable with respect
to the parameters we wish to learn”, we are saying that we can determine if increasing
one of the parameters by a very small amount will cause the loss function to decrease
or increase. For a more detailed discussion of linear and logistic regression, we refer
the reader to [2]
Since the loss function is a measure of our model’s error, and we wish to minimize
the error, we also wish to minimize the loss function. Therefore, we determine for each
trainable parameter whether increasing it or decreasing it will cause the loss function
to decrease and we add/subtract a very small amount to/from the parameter’s value
based off this. Once we do this for all parameters, we recalculate the loss function
and repeat. Since we cannot jump directly to the values where the loss function is
minimized, because the derivative only gives local information about the parameters
effect on the output of the loss function, we must take small steps each iteration
and repeat. In this way, making locally optimal decisions with course corrections
along the way, we ideally arrive at a “global minimum”. That is, the values for the
parameters of the model for which the loss function is lowest given the training set.
The mathematical construct which specifies the direction to move each parameter
in order to minimize the loss function is called the “gradient” and since we use this
gradient to descend the loss function, we call this process gradient descent. There
are many things to consider when preforming gradient descent, such as the size of
changes to parameters at each iteration, but we refer the reader to [3] for a more
thorough and detailed discussion.
Another classic machine learning algorithm is the decision tree. Decision trees
4
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can be used for regression or classification but here we will focus on the classification
case. Decision trees are made up of three parts; a root node, where the decision
process starts, leaf nodes, which are at the other end of the tree opposite of the root
node, and internal nodes, which lay along the path from root to leaf node. There
is only one path from the root node to any given leaf node. During prediction, the
algorithm moves from the root node, through some internal nodes to a leaf, and the
value of said leaf node determines the predicted class of the sample. The path which
the algorithm takes is determined by the value of the sample’s features and “split
conditions” in each of the root and internal nodes, such as xj > 13.
Decision trees are trained by using a labeled training set to determine the split
condition at each node which maximizes the “information gain” in the child nodes.
Starting at the root node which is reachable by all training samples, a split is chosen
which best separates the classes within the training set. This is repeated at the child
nodes of the root node, and repeated again for their children and so on, until the
child nodes produced by a splitting condition are only reachable by training examples
which all belong to the same class, or some other stopping condition is met, such as
maximum depth of the tree. In the case where the leaf node is reachable by training
samples from more then one class, the prediction is the class which the majority of
those training samples belong to.
An extension of the decision tree algorithm is the Random Forest algorithm which
trains a large number of decision trees on random subsets of the training set, using
random subsets of the feature set. At prediction time, each constituent decision tree
predicts the class of the sample which counts as a vote for said class. The votes
from all the sub trees are counted and the class with the most votes is the prediction
of the Random Forest. This is known as an ensemble method, and its strength is
that misclassification occurs only if the majority of the constituent decision trees
make a misclassification. Further, since the constituent decision trees all use different
feature sets and were trained with different training sets, a feature value which is
uncommon for one class will not trick all of the constituent decision trees. The end
result is a model which is more stable when encountering unseen data, achieving
5
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better performance. This is known as generalizability. We say a model generalizes
well when it achieves performance which is equal or better with unseen data as with
the training data. For a deeper discussion on random forests we again refer the reader
to [2]
The last machine learning algorithm which we’ll introduce here is the Neural
Network. Neural networks are much more complex then the algorithms discussed so
far but some of the ideas are the same. The standard neural network architecture
is the feed forward architecture such as the one shown in figure 1.1.1. This type
of neural network makes predictions as follows. The feature values are inputted
into their respective input neuron (or node) in the first layer, called the input layer.
(i.e. feature xj is inputted to the j
th neuron in the input layer.) Next, this value
is propagated along the connections (shown in 1.1.1 as lines connecting the neuron
(circles) in different layers) from the input layer to the first hidden layer. When
the neurons in the next layer receive the values from the previous layer along these
connections, they multiply them by the weight associated with each connection and
sum the results along with a bias. This weighted sum is identical to that calculated
in equation 1 for the linear regression algorithm, except that the feature values are
replaced by the outputs of neurons in the previous layer. Each neuron then applies
an “activation function”, of which there are many different types, such as the sigmoid
function from equation 2. The output of the activation applied to the weighted sum
of incoming signals from the previous layer is the output of that node, which is sent
to the next layer. This process is repeated for an arbitrary number of layers until the
final layer outputs a value which indicates the predicted class.
The way neural networks are trained is also similar to the way the linear and
logistic regression models were trained. Except here there loss function is a complex
composite function where the derivative must be taken with respect to many more
parameters, in some cases well into the tens of millions. However, the basic idea of
gradient descent still applies, incrementally make very small changes to the weights
in a direction which decreases the loss function given a training set, and repeat until
we find some minimum. There are many intricacies to workout when implementing
6
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Fig. 1.1.1: Neural Network with 6 nodes in the input layer, 6 in the hidden layer, and
3 in the output layer
such a method but we do not busy our selves with them here. For a more detailed
discussion of neural networks, architecture and activation function choices, and loss
functions, we refer the reader to [1].
This concludes our preliminary discussion of machine learning. Table 1.1.1 sum-
marizes more in depth sources on the topics briefly discussed here, which the reader
can make use of at their own discretion.






1.2 Machine Learning Interpretability
In the previous section we discuss the basics of machine learning and introduced some
of more well known machine learning algorithms. We discuss how the machine learn-
ing algorithms are trained and how they make predictions but we now introduce one
7
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of the central topics of this thesis, interpretability. Machine Learning interpretability
is the process of giving explanations of a models predictions to humans. It is not an
attempt to understand every thing that is learnt by the model, rather it an attempt
to find intuitive explanations which are simple enough and give information pertinent
to down stream tasks. For example, sometimes we wish to select the best feature set
for a given model, in this case we would like to determine the most significant fea-
tures for feature selection. The processes which determine the feature significances,
of which there are many, is a simple form of machine learning interpretation.
The perfect interpretation of a machine learning model tells us only what we
need to know while leaving out details of the model itself. It leaves out the messy
complexities of the model in order to give us enough information for later tasks. It
is usually not possible to get clear, high fidelity interpretations. Most times we have
to settle for more vague interpretations such as “this input is more influential then
the others” or “the model will still be accurate with such and such features no longer
behaving in an informative way”.
In terms of varieties of interpretations, they can generally be divided into two
groups. Local interpretations are interpretations which apply only to a single sample
or a subset of the sample space. Meanwhile Global interpretations apply to the
entire sample space. Interpretation techniques can also be divided into categories.
Model agnostic, that is techniques which can be applied to any type of machine
learning model, and model specific which can only be applied to a single type of
machine learning model. To be clear, global vs. local is a categorization of the
interpretations themselves, while model-agnostic vs. model-specific is a categorization
of the techniques used to arrive at interpretations.
One last note, since interpretation is done for the sake of down stream tasks,
and further, it is influenced by the type of model and features used, this makes
machine learning interpretation a application specific problem. Hence, the techniques
on exposition in this thesis may be applicable with varying amounts of modification
in other domains, but they are chiefly applicable in the malware detection domain.
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1.3 Machine Learning in Cyber Security
Machine Learning’s application in the cyber security domain is discussed at length in
the following chapter so we give only a brief overview as a primer for the discussion
to come, as well as to elucidate the connection between the various chapters in this
thesis.
Recently, there has been increased ability for malware authors to bypass tradi-
tional malware detection methods. Techniques such as obfuscation and server-side
polymorphism can help authors automatically change malware to be unrecognizable
enough to bypass simple detection techniques. Further, new programming paradigms
such as fileless malware, that is malware that does not exist on the file system of the
infected machine, mean that new malware may not leave behind binaries to study
and be used with traditional detection methods. This has lead security specialists to
turn to machine learning algorithms to augment malware detection systems. How-
ever, with this new detection technique comes new challenges, one of which and the
focus of this thesis, is the need for interpretable machine learning methods.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The remainder of this thesis is laid out as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss Machine
Learning’s roll in cyber security, the challenges presented with its application in mal-
ware detection, and some potential improvements to the current approaches in the
literature. Further we discuss the necessity for machine learning based malware de-
tection as a result of new computing paradigms such as fileless malware, among other
emerging threats. In Chapter 3, we provide a proof of concept fileless malware which
uses benign functionality of JavaScript in order to carry out its malicious actions. We
then test various malware detection softwares against out malware in order to show
the severity of the threat of fileless malware. In Chapter 4 we present techniques for
interpreting machine learning based malware detection models which leverage n-gram
analysis. In Chapter 5 we put forward a novel and fully interpretable approach for
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malware detection which leverages convolutional neural networks. In Chapter 6 we
define a novel approach for evaluating the robustness of a machine learning based
malware detector based off the features it uses. Lastly, we end off in Chapter 7 with
our conclusions and a discussion of future work.
References
[1] C. C. Aggarwal. Neural Networks and Deep Learning. Springer, 2018. isbn:
978-3-319-94462-3. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-94463-0.
[2] T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman. The elements of statistical learning:
data mining, inference and prediction. 2nd ed. Springer, 2009. url: http://
www-stat.stanford.edu/~tibs/ElemStatLearn/.
[3] S. Ruder. “An overview of gradient descent optimization algorithms”. In: CoRR




The Curious Case of Machine
Learning in Malware Detection
Sherif Saad, William Briguglio, and Haytham Elmiligi
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
and Privacy
2.1 Introduction
Nowadays, computer networks and the Internet have become the primary tool for
spreading and distributing malware by malware authors. The massive number of
feature-rich programming languages and off-the-shelf software libraries enable the
development of new sophisticated malware such as botnet, fileless, k-ary and ran-
somware. New computing paradigms, such as cloud computing and the Internet of
Things, expand potential malware infection sites from PC’s to any electronic device.
To decide if software code is malicious or benign, we could either use static anal-
ysis or dynamic analysis. Static analysis techniques do not execute the code and
only examine the code structure and other binary data properties. Dynamic analysis
techniques, on the other hand, execute the code to observe the execution behaviors
of the code over the network or at end-point devices. Some malware detection sys-
tems apply only static or dynamic techniques, and some apply both. While dynamic
malware analysis techniques are not intended to replace static analysis techniques,
recent unconventional malware attacks (botnet, ransomware, fileless, etc.) and the
use of sophisticated evasion techniques to avoid detection have shown the urgent need
of dynamic analysis and the limitations of static analysis. In our opinion, the use of
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dynamic and behavioral malware analysis will dominate the next-generation malware
detection systems.
There is a general belief among cybersecurity experts that antimalware tools and
systems powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning will be the solution
to modern malware attacks. The number of studies published in the last few years
on malware detection techniques that leverage machine learning is a distinct evidence
of this belief as shown in section 2.2. In the literature, various malware detection
techniques using machine learning are proposed with excellent detection accuracy.
However, malware attacks in the wild continue to grow and manage to bypass malware
detection systems powered by machine learning techniques. This is because it is
difficult to operate and deploy machine learning for malware detection in a production
environment or the performance in a production environment is disturbing (e.g. high
false positives rate). In fact, there is a significant difference (a detection gap) between
the accuracy of malware detection techniques in the literature and their accuracy in
a production environment.
A perfect malware detection system will detect all types of malicious software
and will never consider a benign software as a malicious one. Cohen provided a
formal proof that creating a perfect malware detection system is not possible [7, 6].
Moreover, Chess and White proved that a malware detector with zero false positives
is not possible [4]. Selcuk et al. discussed the undecidable problems in malware
detection in more details [31]. In light of this, the high levels of accuracy claimed
by commercial malware detection systems and some malware detection studies in
literature seems questionable.
In this Chapter, we briefly review the current state of the art in malware detection
using machine learning approaches. Then, we discuss the importance of dynamic
and behavioral analysis based on emerging malware threats. Next, the shortcomings
of the current machine learning malware detectors are explained to indicate their
limitations in the wild. Finally, we discuss the possible solutions to improve the
quality of malware detection systems and point out potential research directions.
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2.2 Literature Review
In recent years, machine learning algorithms have been used to design both static and
dynamic analysis techniques for malware detection. Hassen et al. proposed a new
technique for malware classification using static analysis based on control statement
shingling [15]. In their work, they used static analysis to classify malware instances
into new or known malware families. They extracted features from disassembled
malicious binaries and used the random forest algorithm to classify malware using
the extracted features. Using a dataset of 10,260 malware instances, they reported
up to 99.21% accuracy.
Static analysis has been used to study malwares that infect embedded systems,
mobile devices, and other IoT devices. Naeem et al. proposed a static analysis
technique to detect IoT malware [24]. The proposed technique converts a malware
file to a grayscale image and extracts a set of visual features from the malware image
to train an SVM classifier that could distinguish between malware families using
visual features. Using a dataset of 9342 samples that belong to 25 malware families,
they reported 97.4% accuracy. Su et al. proposed a similar technique to classify
IoT malware into malware families using visual features and image recognition [34].
Their approach is very similar to the one proposed in [24]. They used a one-class
SVM classifier and tested their approach on IoT malwarethat infect Linux-like IoT
systems; they reported 94.0% accuracy for detecting malware and 81.8% accuracy
for detecting malware families. Raff et al. proposed a malware detection technique
using static analysis and deep learning [29]. The proposed technique achieved 94.0%
detection accuracy.
Several works have been proposed to detect Android malware apps using static
analysis techniques. Sahin et al. proposed an Android malware detection model that
uses app permission to detect malicious apps [26]. They used the permissions required
by the app with a weighted distance function and kNN plus Naive Bayes classifier to
detect malicious apps. They reported an accuracy up to 93.27%. Su and Fung used
sensitive functions and app permissions to detect Android malware [35]. They used
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different machine learning algorithms such as SVM, decision tree, and kNN to build
an android malware detector. They reported an average accuracy between 85.0% and
90.0%
Collecting and monitoring all malware behaviors is a complicated and time con-
suming process. For that reason, several works in the literature focused on collecting
partial dynamic behaviors of the malware. Lim et al. [19] proposed a malware detec-
tion technique by analyzing network traffic generated when the malware communi-
cates with a malicious C&C server such as in the case of botnet or ransomware. The
proposed technique extracts a set of features from network flows to present a flows
sequence. The authors used different sequence alignment algorithms to classify mal-
ware traffic. They reported an accuracy above 60% when analyzing malware traffic
in a real network environment.
Kilgallon et al. applied machine learning and dynamic malware analysis [17]. The
proposed technique gathers register value information and API calls made by the
monitored malware binaries. The collected information is stored in vector structures
and analyzed using a value set analysis method. Then, they used a linear similarity
metric to compare unseen malware to known malware binaries. Their experiment
showed that the proposed technique could detect malware with an accuracy up to
98.0%
Omind and Nathan proposed a behavioral-based malware detection method using
a deep belief network [9]. The proposed method collected data about malware behav-
iors from a sandbox environment. The collected data is API calls, registry entries,
visited websites, accessed ports, and IP addresses. Then using a deep neural network
of eight layers, it generates malware signatures. These signatures could be used to
train malware detectors. In their experiments, they reported up to 95.3% detection
accuracy with a malware detector utilizing the SVM algorithm.
Yeo et al. proposed a new malware detection method by monitoring malicious be-
haviors in network traffic [38]. They designed 35 features to describe malicious traffic
of malware instances. They tested several machine learning algorithms including
CNN, MLP, SVM, and random forest. The proposed method achieved an accuracy
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above 85% when utilizing CNN or random forest. Prokofiev et al. proposed a machine
learning technique to detect C&C traffic of infected IoT devices [28]. The proposed
approach used network traffic features such as port number, IP addresses, connection
duration and frequency. They reported a detection accuracy up to 97.3%. However,
the proposed approach is still relying on traditional malware analysis methods and
will not be able to work in production IoT deployment as discussed in [33]. Several
hybrid malware detection techniques that combine both static and dynamic analysis
have also been proposed [21, 27]. These techniques try to improve the quality and
performance of malware detection systems by taking advantage of static and dynamic
analysis to build robust malware detection systems.
2.3 Emerging Malware Threats
With the recent changes in malware development and the rise of commercial malware
(malicious code rented or purchased), many new challenges are facing malware ana-
lysts that make static analysis more difficult and impractical. These challenges will
force anti malware vendors to adapt behavioral malware analysis and detection tech-
niques. In our opinion, there are two main reasons behind these challenges; the rise of
unconventional computing paradigms and unconventional evasion techniques. There
is a new generation of malware that take advantage of unconventional computing
paradigms and off-the-shelf soft-ware libraries written by feature-rich programming
languages. The current state-of-the-art malware analysis/detection techniques and
tools are not effective against this new generation of malware.
2.3.1 Unconventional Computing Paradigms
New computing paradigms and technologies such as cloud computing, the internet of
things, big data, in-memory computing, and blockchain introduced new playgrounds
for malware authors to develop com-plex and sophisticated malwares that are almost
un-detectable. Here we describe several recent examples of new malware threats that
are difficult to detect or analyze using static analysis.
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For instance, the Internet of Things (IoT) is an appealing platform for modern
and sophisticated malware such as ransomware. Zhang-Kennedy et al. discussed the
ransomware threat in IoT and how a self-spreading ransomware could infect an IoT
ecosystem [39]. The authors pointed out that the ransomware will mainly lock down
IoT devices and disable the essential functions of these devices. The study focused
on identifying the attack vectors in IoT, the techniques for ransomware self-spreading
in IoT, and predicting the most likely class of IoT applications to be a target for
ransomware attacks. Finally, the authors identified the techniques the ransomware
could apply to lock down IoT devices. Authors in [39] used a Raspberry Pi to develop
a proof of concept IoT ransomware that can infect an IoT system. One interesting
aspect in [39] is the need for collaboration or swarming behavior in IoT ransomware,
where the IoT ransomware will spread as much as possible and then lock down the
devices or device and then spread.
Miller and Valasek developed a proof-of-concept for malicious code that infects
connected cars and lockdowns key functions [22].For instance, the authors demon-
strated the ability for the malicious code to control the steering wheel of a vehicle,
disable the breaks, lock doors, and shut down the engine while in motion. Behaving
as ransomware, this real example of a malware that locks and disables key features
in IoT systems (e.g. connected cars) could have life threatening consequences if the
ransom is not paid. The study explained a design flow in the Controller Area Network
(CAN) protocol that allows malicious and crafted CAN messages to be injected into
the vehicle CAN channel by a compromised mobile phone that is connected to the
vehicle entertainment unit. It was reported that for some vehicles only the dealership
could restore and patch the vehicle to prevent this attack. Choi et al. proposed a
solution for malware attacks in connected vehicles using machine learning [5]. The
solution uses SVM to distinguish between crafted malicious CAN messages, and be-
nign CAN messages generated by actual electronic control units (ECU). The model
extracts features from the vehicle ECUs and creates fingerprints for those ECUs.
The ECU fingerprint is noticeable in a benign CAN message and does not exist in a
malicious message.
16
2. THE CURIOUS CASE OF MACHINE LEARNING IN MALWARE DETECTION
Azmoodeh et al. discussed a new technique to detect ransomware attacks in IoT
systems by monitoring the energy consumption of infected devices [3]. As a proof
of concept, they studied the energy consumption of infected Android devices. The
devices were infected by a ransomware with crypto impact. They used different
machine learning models (kNN, SVM, NN, and Random Forest) to analyze energy
consumption data and extract unique patterns to detect compromised Android de-
vices. They reported a ransomware detection accuracy of 95.65%.
In 2015, Karam (INTERPOL) and Kamluk (Kaspersky lab) introduced a proof of
concept distributed malware that also takes advantage of blockchain technology [16].
In 2018, Moubarak et al. provided design and implementation of a K-ary mal-
ware (distributed malware) that takes advantages of the blockchain networks such
as Etherum and Hyperledger [23]. The proposed malware is stored and executed in-
side blockchain networks and acts as a malicious keylogger. While detecting a K-ary
malware is an NP-hard problem [10], it is also complicated to implement a K-ary
malware. However, Mubarak’s works demonstrated the simplicity of K-ary malware
development by taking advantage of blockchain technology as a distributed and de-
centralized network.
2.3.2 Unconventional Evasion Techniques
The new generation of malware will use advanced evasion techniques to avoid de-
tection by antimalware systems and tools. New evasion techniques implemented by
malware authors use new technologies and off-the-shelf software libraries that enable
the design of sophisticated evasion methods. Antimalware vendors and malware re-
searchers discussed recent examples of using new antimalware evasion techniques in
the wild.
Fileless malware or memory-resident malware is the new technique used by mal-
ware authors to develop and execute malicious attacks. Fileless malware resides in
device memory and does not leave any files on the infected device file system. This
makes the detection of the fileless malware using signature-based detection or static
analysis infeasible. In addition, the fileless malware takes advantage of the utilities
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and libraries that already exist in the platform of the infected device to complete
its malicious intents. In other words, benign applications and software libraries are
manipulated by fileless malware to accomplish the attack objectives.
Fileless malware attacks and incidents are already observed in the wild compromis-
ing large enterprises. According to KASPERSKY lab, 140 enterprises were attacked
in 2017 using fileless malwares [11]. Ponemon Institute reported that 77% of the
attacks against companies use fileless techniques [36]. Moreover, there are several
signs that ransomware attacks are going fileless, as discussed in [20]. Besides these
signs, there are other reasons in our opinion that confirms that ransomware and other
malware attacks will be fileless. One main reason is the moving towards in-memory
computing.
In recent years, in-memory computing and in-memory data stores became the first
backbone and storage technology for many organizations. Many bigdata platforms
and data grids (Apache Spark, Redis, HazelCast, etc.) enable storing data in memory
for performance and scalability requirements. Valuable data and information is stored
in memory for a longtime before moving to a persistent data store. In-Memory
ransomware that encrypts in-memory data (such as recent transactions, financial
information, etc.) present a severe and aggressive attack. This is because any attempt
to reset or reboot the machine to remove the ransomware from the device memory or
shutdown the application will result in losing this valuable data permanently.
The moving towards distributed and decentralized computing is another reason
for the rise of fileless ransomware. In distributed and decentralized computing several
nodes and devices are available to store the in-memory malware, which will increase
the life expectancy of the malware since there will always be a group of active nodes
were the malware could replicate and store itself.
The recent and massive development in machine learning/artificial intelligence
(aka data science) and a large number of off-the-shelf machine learning libraries enable
malware authors to develop advanced evasion techniques. Rigaki and Garcia proposed
the use of deep learning techniques to create malicious malware samples that evade
detection by mimicking the behaviors of benign applications [30]. In their work, a
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proof of concept was proposed to demonstrate how malware authors could cover the
malware C&C traffic. The authors use a Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
to enable malware (e.g., botnet) to mimic the traffic of a legitimate application and
avoid detection. The study showed that it is possible to modify the source code
of malware to receive parameters from a GAN to change the behaviors of its C&C
traffic to mimic the behaviors of other legitimate network applications, such as Face-
book traffic. The enhanced malware samples were tested against the Stratosphere
Linux IPS (slips) system, which uses machine learning to detect malicious traffic.
The experiment showed that 63.42% of the malicious traffic was able to bypass the
detection.
A research team from IBM demonstrated the use of artificial intelligence to en-
gineering malware attacks [8]. In their study, the authors proposed DeepLocker as
a proof of concept to show how next-generation malware could leverage artificial in-
telligence. DeepLocker is a malware generation engine that malware authors could
use to empower traditional malware samples such as WannaCry with artificial intelli-
gence. A deep convolutional neural network (CNN) was used to customize a malware
attack by combining a benign application and a malware sample to generate a hybrid
malware that bypasses detection by mimicking benign behaviors. Besides that, the
malware is engineered to unlock its malicious payload when it reaches a target (end-
point) with a loose predefined set of attributes. In the study, those attributes were
the biometrics feature of the target such as facial and voice features. The malware
uses CNN to detect and confirm target identity, and upon target confirmation, an
encryption key is generated and used by the WannCry malware to encrypt the files
on the target endpoint device. The encryption key is only generated by matching
the voice and the facial features of the target. This means reverse engineering the
malware using static analysis is not useful to recover the encryption key.
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2.4 Practical Challenges
The new and emerging malware threats discussed in section 2.3 provide strong evi-
dence for the need of adopting dynamic and behavioural analysis to build malware
detection tools. The use of machine learning is the most promising technique to
implement malware detectors and tools that apply behavioural analysis as shown
in section 2.2. While the use of machine learning for malware detection has shown
promising results in both static and dynamic analysis, there are significant challenges
that limit the success of machine learning based malware detectors in the wild.
2.4.1 Cost of Training Detectors
The first challenge is the cost of training and updating malware detectors in pro-
duction environments. Malware detection is unlike other domains where machine
learning techniques have been applied successfully such as computer vision, natural
language processing, and e-commerce. Malware instances evolve and change their be-
haviors over a short period; some studies by antimalware vendors reported that a new
malware instance could change its behaviors in less than 24 hours since it has been
released [13, 2]. This means a frequently trained machine learning model will become
out-dated. This also means we need to frequently retrain our malware detectors to
be able to detect new and mutated malware instances. Therefore, adaptability in
machine learning models for malware detection is a crucial requirement and not just
an ancillary capability.
Recently, the challenge of adaptability, and scalability of machine learning models
for malware detection in the wild has become obvious [25]. The majority of the work
proposed in the literature has done very little to reduce and optimize the feature
space to design detectors ready for early malware detection in a production environ-
ment [14]. For instance, it is not clear how the proposed detection methods will scale
when the number of monitored endpoints increases. Unlike computer vision, natural
language processing and other areas that utilize machine learning, malware instances
continue to evolve and change. This mostly requires retraining machine learning mod-
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els in production, which is an expensive and complicated task. Therefore, when using
machine learning for malware detection, we need to think differently. New methods
to reduce the cost of retraining malware detectors and improve detection quality are
urgent.
2.4.2 Malware Detector Interpretability
Cybersecurity analysts always prefer solutions that are interpretable and understand-
able, such as rule-based or signature-based detection. This is because of the need to
tune and optimize these solutions to mitigate and control the effect of false positives
and false negatives. Interpreting machine learning models is a new and open chal-
lenge [32]. However, it is expected that an interpretable machine learning solution
will be domain specific, for instance, interpretable solutions for machine learning mod-
els in healthcare are different than solutions in malware detection [1]. Any malware
detector will generate false positives, and unless malware analysts can understand
and interpret the reason that a benign application was wrongly classified as mali-
cious, they will not accept those black box malware detectors. To our knowledge, no
work in the literature investigated the interpretability of machine learning models for
malware detection.
One difficulty with machine learning interpretability in this domain is that many
of the features are not meaningful to humans without the context which they appear
in. This means it is necessary to map back from features to raw data in order to better
understand the feature and its context at the time of classification. The problem of
mapping features to raw data is touched upon in Chapters 4 and 5 and applies to
malware detectors which use ngrams or binaries converted to images. However, the
techniques used to map features to raw data will also be application specific.
2.4.3 Adversarial Malware
Last but not least, a malware detection system utilizing machine learning could be
defeated using adversarial malware samples. For instance, Kolosnjaji et al. showed
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in [18] that by using an intelligent evasion attack they can defeat the deep learning
detection system proposed in [29] by Raff et al. They simply used their knowledge of
how the proposed deep learning detection system operates and designed a gradient-
based attack as an evasion technique to overcome it. With adversarial malware, the
system detection accuracy dropped from 94.0% to almost 50.0%. Machine learn-
ing algorithms are not designed to work with adversarial examples. Grosse et al.
demonstrated that using adversarial malware samples; they could reduce the detec-
tion accuracy of a malware detection system that uses static analysis and machine
learning to 63.0% [12]. They also showed that adopting anti adversarial machine
learning techniques used in computer vision is not effective in malware detection.
Yang et al. proposed adversarial training as a solution for adversarial malware [37].
They designed a method for adversarial android malware instances generation. The
proposed method requires access to the malware binaries and source code, besides, it
is mainly useful for static malware detection systems.
2.5 Bridging the Detection Gap
To overcome the challenges we discussed in section 2.4, we propose new solutions to
mitigate these challenges and reduce the gap.
2.5.1 Disposable Micro Detectors
Current best practices in constructing and building machine learning models follow
a monolithic architecture. In a monolithic architecture, a single computationally
expensive (to build and train) machine learning model is used to detect malware.
While this architecture or approach for building machine learning models is successful
in other domains, we believe it is unsuitable for malware detection given the highly
evolving characteristics of malware instances. We propose a new approach inspired by
the microservices architecture. In this approach, multiple, small, inexpensive, focused
machine learning models are built and orchestrated to detect malware instances. Each
model or detector is built to detect the behaviors of a specific malware instance (e.g.,
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Mirai, WannaCry), or at most a single malware family (a group of similar malware
instances). Also, each model or detector is built using features that are similar, such as
having the same computational cost, or unique to the specific execution environment.
This is because out of the super set of features designed to detect malware, it is
common that a subset of these features could be more or less useful to detect a specific
malware instance or family. The use of micro (small) and focused detectors reduce the
cost of retraining and deployment in production. This is because detectors for new
malware could be trained and added without the need to retrain existing detectors.
In addition, when malware detectors become outdated as a result of a malware’s
evolving behavior, the outdated detectors are disposed of and replaced by new ones.
The use of micro-detectors enables adaptability by design rather than attempting to
change machine learning models and algorithms to support adaptability.
2.5.2 Analyst Friendly Interpretation
Adopting sophisticated machine learning techniques for malware detection in a pro-
duction environment is a challenge. This is because most of the time it is not possible
to understand how the machine learning systems make their malware detection deci-
sions. Therefore, tuning and maintaining these systems is a challenge in production
and new techniques for malware analysts to interpret and evaluate the performance
of malware detectors are needed. We propose the use of evolutionary computation
techniques such as genetic algorithms or clonal selection algorithms to generate an
interpretation for black-box machine learning models such as deep learning. Using
evolutionary computation, we could describe the decisions of malware detectors us-
ing a set of IF-Then rules. The only information required is the input features the
malware detector uses to make a decision.
The IF-Then rules are useful to explain the behaviors that trigger a specific deci-
sion (e.g., malicious or benign) by the malware detector. Cybersecurity and malware
analyst are comfortable working with IF-Then rules. These rules will help in under-
standing the decision made by malware detectors, explain the scope of the detection,
and identify potential over generalization or overfitting that could result in false pos-
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itives or false negatives.
It is essential that the IF-Then rules set interpretation of the malware detector is
expressed in raw malware behaviors and not in machine learning features. Machine
learning features are most likely understandable by machine learning engineers and
experts. The interpretation should be acceptable to a malware analyst who does not
need to be a machine learning expert.
Other model specific Interpretations techniques, such as the ones discussed in
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, can be utilized to improve model confidence so stake-
holders are more likely to trust machine learning based malware detectors. Further,
these approaches can ensure the model is not easily manipulated and thus prone to
adversarial malware by over-relying on easy to change and superficial features. In this
way, interpretation can help ensure model robustness. Lastly, machine learning mod-
els learn complex patterns that can be utilized making beyond making classification
decisions. Interpretation can be used so that patterns learn by a machine learn-
ing model can help malware analyst with downstream tasks such as finding import
snippets of code.
2.5.3 Anti Adversarial Malware
To improve the resilience of malware detectors against adversarial malware, we be-
lieve it is essential to study the effort required by the malware authors to design an
adversarial malware for specific malware detectors. For example, what technique a
malware author would use to probe and study a malware detector in production to
design a malware that could bypass a detector.
Measuring the effort to probe detectors and design adversarial malware under
two main settings is essential. The first setting is black-box, where the malware
authors have minimum knowledge about the malware detector’s internal design and
the features used by the machine learning algorithm. The second setting is white-box,
where the malware authors have sufficient knowledge about the malware detector’s
internal design and the machine learning algorithm. Training and updating malware
detectors is likely the most efficient solution against adversarial malware. Knowing
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the effort needed to evade a malware detector will help in designing training strategies
and policies to increase the effort required to evade the detectors.
As we mentioned before, Cohen provided a formal proof that creating a perfect
malware detection system is not possible [7, 6]. We believe that designing a perfect
adversarial malware is not possible. Therefore we expect that using ensemble-based
hybrid machine learning approach for malware detectors will be effective against ad-
versarial malware. It is expected that by creating a malware detector using an en-
semble hybrid machine-learning approach, the risk of evading detection will decrease
and the effort to design adversarial malware will increase. A hybrid machine learning
model is when two or more different machine learning algorithms are used to construct
the model. In the literature, adversarial malware samples evade malware detectors
that use a single machine learning algorithm or technique [37, 12, 18]. In our method,
a hybrid machine learning approach for building a malware detector is an approach
to provide a defense-in-depth model for malware detectors.
2.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we reviewed the current state-of-the-art in malware detection using
machine learning. We discussed the recent trends in malware development and emerg-
ing malware threats. We argued that behavioral analysis would dominate the next
generation anti malware systems. We discussed the challenges of applying machine
learning to detect malware in the wild and proposed our thoughts on how we could
overcome these challenges. Machine learning malware detectors require inexpensive
training methods; they need to be interpretable for the malware analysts and not
only for machine learning experts. Finally, they need to tolerate adversarial malware
by design
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3.1 Introduction
Fileless malware is a new class of the memory-resident malware family that success-
fully infects and compromises a target system without leaving a trace on the target
filesystem or secondary memory (e.g., hard drive). Fileless malware infects the tar-
get’s main-memory (RAM) and executes its malicious payload. Fileless malware is
not just another memory-resident malware. To our knowledge, Fred Cohen developed
the first memory-resident malware (Lehigh Virus) in the early 80s. This usually leads
some researchers to believe that fileless malware is not a new malware threat but
only a new name for an old threat. However, this is not true, fileless malware has
some distinguishing properties. First, malware attacks require some file infection or
writing to the hard drive, this includes traditional memory resident malware. Fileless
malware infection and propagation does not require writing any data to the target
device filesystem. However, it is possible that the malicious payload (e.g., the end
goal ) of the fileless malware writes data to the hard drive, for example, a fileless
ransomware, but again the ransomware propagation and infection are fileless. The
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second key property of fileless malware is that it depends heavily on using benign
software utilities and libraries already installed on the target device to execute the
malicious payload. For instance, a fileless ransomware will use cryptographic libraries
and APIs already installed on the target to complete its attack rather than installing
new cryptographic libraries or implementing its own.
There are other unique properties of fileless malware, but the most important
ones are the fileless infection approach and the use of benign utilities and libraries
of the compromised machine to execute the malicious payload. Those two properties
of fileless malware make it an effective threat in evading and bypassing sophisticated
anti-malware detection systems. This is because most anti-malware relies on scan-
ning the compromised filesystem to detect malware infections. Also, because fileless
malware use legitimate software utilities and programs to attack computer systems,
it is challenging for anti-malware systems that use dynamic analysis to detect fileless
malware. Moreover, being fileless is an anti-forensics technique, since it does not leave
any trace after the attack is complete, it is tough for forensics investigator to reverse
engineer the malware.
Fileless malware attacks and incidents are already observed in the wild compromis-
ing large enterprises. According to KASPERSKY lab, 140 enterprises were attacked
in 2017 using fileless malwares [5]. Ponemon Institute reported that 77% of the attacks
against companies use fileless techniques [18]. Also, CYREN recently reported that
during 2017 there was over 300% increase in the use of fileless attacks. Moreover, they
expected that the new generation of Ransomware would be fileless [7]. This expec-
tation proved to be correct when TrendMicro reported the analysis of SOREBRECT
Ransomware, the first fileless ransomware attack in the wild [19]. However, we think
that it is inaccurate to describe SOREBRECT Ransomware as fileless malware, since
it places an executable file on the compromised machine which injects the malicious
payload into a running system process. Then, it deletes the file and any trace on
the system logs using a self-destruct routine. Because the infection and the injection
of SOREBRECT Ransomware requires placing files on the compromised host, we do
not think it is a true fileless malware. Moreover, deleting the files is not enough to
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hide the trace, file carving techniques could be used to recover the deleted files.
Another common trend in developing fileless malware is the use of Microsoft Pow-
erShell. PowerShell is a command-line shell and scripting language that allows system
administrators to manage and automate tasks related to running processes, the op-
erating system, and networks. It is preinstalled by default on new Windows versions
and it can be installed on Linux and MacOS systems. PowerShell is a good example
of a benign and powerful system utility that could be used by fileless malware. Sev-
eral reports by anti-malware vendors discuss how malware authors take advantages
of PowerShell to develop sophisticated fileless malware [10].
In this chapter, we summarize our research on fileless malware attacks in modern
web applications. We investigate the possibility of developing a fileless malware using
modern JavaScript(JS) features that were introduced with HTML5. In our assessment
of the potential threats of fileless malware attacks, we explore the use of benign
JavaScript and HTML5 features to develop fileless malware. Based on our analysis
we implemented JSLess as a proof-of-concept(PoC) fileless JavaScript malware that
successfully infects a web browser and executes several malicious payloads.
The contribution of this Chapter is threefold. First, identify the malicious poten-
tial of new benign features in web technology and how they could be used to develop
fileless malware. Second, design and implement JSLess as a PoC fileless JS malware
that uses a new dynamic injection method and advanced evasion techniques to infect
modern web apps and execute a variety of attacks. Third, demonstrate the threats
of fileless malware in modern web applications by evaluating the proposed fileless
malware with several free and commercial malware detection tools that apply both
static and dynamic analysis.
This chapter is organized as follows; section 3.2 is a literature review of fileless
malware and JavaScript malware. In section 3.3, we explain new benign features in
modern JavaScript and HTML5 and their security issues. Then, in section 3.4 we
present our JavaScript fileless malware design and implementation. Next, in section
3.5 we evaluate the evasion behaviors of the JS fileless malware against free and
commercial anti-malware tools, then we discuss possible detection and mitigation
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techniques. Finally, a conclusion and possible future work is presented in section 3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
Code injection attacks have been studied from different perspectives in the literature.
The research in this area tried to detect malicious behaviors in JavaScripts using
various methods, including signature-based analysis, utilizing machine learning algo-
rithms, using honeynets, and applying several deobfuscation techniques. This section
discusses the main research directions in this area and highlights some of the most
important contributions in the literature.
S. Yoon et al. proposed a method to generate unique signatures for malicious
JavaScripts [23]. The authors used content-based signature generation techniques
and utilized the Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and Bal-
anced Iterative Reducing and Clustering using Hierarchies methods to generate the
conjunction signatures for JavaScripts [23]. Although signature-based analysis can
help detect several malicious behaviours, the work in [23] is based on the assumption
that the attack type of the input JavaScripts is known, which is not always a practi-
cal assumption in real-life environments. Moreover, obfuscation remains a challenging
problem that reduces the effectiveness of signature-based techniques.
G. Blanc et al. tried to address the obfuscation problem by applying abstract
syntax tree (AST) based methods to characterize obfuscating transformations found
in malicious JavaScript [2]. The authors used AST-based methods to demonstrate
significant regularities in obfuscated JavaScript programs. The work in [2] is based
on generating AST fingerprints (ASTFs) for each JS file present in their learning
dataset then manually picking representative subtrees for further processing. The
manual intervention in this procedure and relying only on the training data sets
without providing a mechanism to update the training set with new samples raise
many questions about the feasibility of this solution. Moreover, the work in [2] did
not consider the different categories of obfuscation techniques in real-world malicious
JavaScript, which was analyzed by W. Xu et al. in [22]. Similar work was done by I.
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AL-Taharwa1 et al. to detect obfuscation in JavaScript using semantic-based analysis
based on the variable length context-based feature extraction (VCLFE) scheme that
takes advantage of AST representation [17].
One controversial issue in this area of research is the physical location where the
detection mechanism takes place. One approach is to collect and analyze HTTP
traffic via local proxy and implement the detection algorithm on the proxy side [12].
Another approach is to implement the detection mechanism on the client side, such as
the work done by V. Sachin et al., who used light-weight JavaScript instrumentation
that enables static and dynamic analysis of the visited webpage to detect malicious
behavior [13]. R. K. Kishor et al. took an extra step and developed an extension that
can be installed on the client web browser to detect malicious web contents [6]. Similar
work was done by C. Wang et al., who focused on the browser detection mechanism
integrated with HTML5 and Cross Origin resource sharing (CORS) properties [20].
In recent years, JavaScript became a very popular solution for hybrid mobile ap-
plications. This recent adoption of technology in mobile applications poses a new
risk of malicious code injection attacks on mobile devices. J. Mao et al. proposed
a method to detect anomalous behaviors in hybrid Android apps as anomalies in
function call behaviors [9]. The authors instrumented the JavaScript code dynami-
cally in the JavaScript engine to intercept function calls of JavaScript in hybrid apps.
They also extracted events from the Android WebView component to enhance the
performance of their proposed detection model [9].
Since the feature engineering step is the core of any machine-learning malware
detection solution, many researchers focused on developing a feature engineering
methodology. H. Adas et al. proposed a method to extract inspection features from
over two million mobile URLs [1]. The authors used a MapReduce/Hadoop based
cloud computing platform to train and implement their classifier and evaluate its
performance. Although this is a good step towards building a cloud-based classifier,
more experiments need to be conducted to evaluate its efficiency with respect to real-
time detection of malware. Moreover, the classification model in [1] was trained with
features based on the static analysis of the malicious code, which is not an efficient
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approach in detecting most fileless malwares.
S. Ndichu et al. developed a neural network model that can be trained to learn
the context information of texts [11]. The main contribution of the work in [11] is
developing a new feature extraction method and using unsupervised learning algo-
rithms that produce vectors of fixed lengths. These vectors can be used to train a
neural network that classifies the JavaScript code as normal or malicious [11]. Similar
work was done earlier by Y. Wang et al. using deep learning [21]. Wang et al. used
deep features extracted by stacked denoising auto-encoders (SdA) to detect malicious
JavaScript codes [21].
Neural networks were not the only machine learning framework used to detect
malicious JavaScript codes. Seshagiri et al. used Support Vector Machine (SVM) to
detect malicious JavaScript codes [15]. Features were extracted using static analysis
of web pages. Although ML is a promising solution, there are many challenges that
face developers during the implementation of such solutions. The main challenge is
creating a feature vector that can truly characterize the behaviour of fileless malware.
Fileless malware does not leave clear traces on the victim’s machine and therefore are
very difficult to identify.
Other research directions are considered in the literature. The following are few
examples of different approaches considered by researchers in the last few years. B.
Sayed et al. proposed a model that uses information flow control dynamically at
run-time to detect malicious JavaScript [14]. Y. Fange et al. used Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) to develop a malicious JavaScript detection model [4]. V. Shen
used a high-level fuzzy Petri net (HLFPN) to detect JavaScript malware [16]. D.
Cosovan used hidden markov models and linear classifiers to detect JavaScript-based
malware [3]. Last but not least, D. Maiorca et al. used discriminant and adversary-
aware API analysis to detect malicious scripting code[8].
Although the previous work in this research area presented promising results, there
are many challenges that prevent accurate detection of fileless malwares in real web
applications. To highlight the significance of the threat posed by fileless malwares,
this chapter presents a practical design and implementation of a fileless malware as
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a PoC to demonstrate the threats of fileless malware in web applications.
3.3 Benign Features with Malicious Potentials
With the introduction of HTML5, a new generation of modern web applications
become a reality. This is mainly because HTML5 introduced a rich-set of powerful
APIs and features that can be used by JavaScript. Some of the new features and APIs
in HTML focus on enabling the development of web apps with high connectivity and
performance. Further, HTML5 provides a set of APIs that allow web applications
written in JavaScript to access information about the host running the web app
and also other peripheral devices connected to the host. For instance, a web app
developed with HTML5 and JavaScript could have access to the user geolocation,
device orientation, mic, and camera.
While these new powerful features were proposed to improve web application
development, we found in our analysis of these features that hackers and malware
authors could misuse them. Many of these benign features have serious malicious
potential. In this section, we will mainly focus on HTML5 features that were proposed
to boost web application performance, scalability, and connectivity.
3.3.1 WebSockets
WebSocket is a new communication protocol that enables a web-client and a web-
server to establish a two-way (full-duplex) interactive communication channel over
a single TCP connection. It provides bi-directional real-time communication which
is an urgent requirement for modern interactive web applications. With WebSocket,
the communication method between the web-client and the web-server is not lim-
ited to pull-communication. Instead, push-communication and even an interactive
communication become possible. For this reason, WebSocket becomes the dominate
technology in developing instant messaging apps, gaming applications, streaming ser-
vices, or any web app which requires data exchange between the client and the server
in real-time.
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WebSocket is currently supported by all major web browsers such as Chrome,
Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE. Moreover, the WebSocket protocol is supported by
common programming languages such as Java, Python, C#, and others. This enables
the development of desktop, mobile apps, or even microservices that communicate
using WebSocket as a modern and convenient communication protocol.
It is clear that by using WebSocket the connectivity of web apps becomes much
higher quality and much more reliable. However, WebSocket is considered by web
security researchers a security risk. WebSocket enables a new attack vector for mali-
cious actors. Common web attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and man in the
middle (MitM) are possible over WebSockets. WebSocket by design does not obey
the same-origin policy; this means the web browser will allow a WebSocket script
to connect to different web pages even if they do not share the same-origin (same
URI scheme, host and port number). Again WebSocket by design is not bound by
cross-origin resource sharing (CORS). This means a web app running inside the client
web browser could request resources that have a different origin from the web app.
This flexibility could be easily abused by malicious actors as we will demonstrate in
the next section.
3.3.2 WebWorker
Originally JavaScript is a single-threaded language which means in any web app there
is only a single line of code or statement that can be executed at any given time. As
a result, JavaScript cannot perform multiple tasks simultaneously. WebWorker is
a new JavaScript feature that was introduced with HTML5 to improve the perfor-
mance of the JavaScript applications. WebWorker enables JavaScript code to run in
a background thread separate from the main execution thread of a web app. In other
words WebWorker allows web applications to execute tasks in the background with-
out impacting the user interface as it works completely separate from the UI thread.
For this reason, WebWorkers are typically used to run long and expensive operations
without blocking the UI. For instance, the code in listing 3.1 initializes a new web
worker object and runs the code in worker.js asynchronously in a new thread.
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if (typeof(worker) == "undefined") {
worker = new Worker("worker.js");
}
Listing 3.1: WebWorker Initialization Example
WebWorker should be used to do computationally intensive tasks to avoid block-
ing the UI or any other code executed in the main thread. If a computationally
intensive task executes in the main JavaScript thread, the web app will freeze and
become unresponsive to the user. WebWorker is currently supported by all major
web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, and IE.
As we can see WebWorker is an essential feature for developing a modern and
responsive web application. However, the devil is in the details. While WebWorker
seems like a harmless feature, it opens the door for several malicious scenarios and
security issues. For example, is allows DOM-based XSS. CORS does not bind it, and
hence a web worker could share and access resources from different origins. But in
our opinion, the most critical security issue with WebWorker is its ability to insert
silent running JavaScript code. This could enable a malicious payload to run in a
background thread created by malicious or compromised web apps. One possible
example is using a WebWorker with a malicious web app to preform cryptocurrency
mining without the users’ consent. On the bright side, the WebWorker will terminate
if the user closes the web browser or the web app that created the web worker object.
However, as we will see in the next subsection, malware authors can work around this
with ServiceWorkers.
3.3.3 ServiceWorker
ServiceWorker is another new appealing JavaScript feature. We could consider Ser-
viceWorker as a special type of WebWoker. ServiceWorker allows running JavaScript
code in a separate background thread. This is very similar to WebWorker but unlike
WebWorker, the lifetime of the ServiceWorker is not tied to a specific webpage or
even the web browser. This means even if the user navigates away from the web
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app that created the ServiceWorker or closes the web browser, the ServiceWorker
will continue to run in the background. The ServiceWorker will normally terminate
when it has complete its task (e.g., execute its script) or received a termination signal
from the web server, or terminate abnormally as a result of a crash, system reboot or
shutdown.
ServiceWorker was introduced to enable a rich offline experience to users and
improve the performance of modern web apps. The code in listing 3.2 shows an
example that creates a ServiceWorker from the file sw demo.js. ServiceWorkers share
the same security issues and risks that exist in WebWorkers but the lifetime of the
security risks persists longer.
window.addEventListener(’load’, () => {
navigator.serviceWorker.register(’/sw_demo.js’)
.then(( registration) => {
// ServiceWorker registered successfully
}, (err) => {
// ServiceWorker registration failed
});
});
Listing 3.2: ServiceWorker Registration Example
3.4 JavaScript Fileless Malware
In this section, we explain how the benign JavaScript features we introduced in section
3.3 could be used to implement a fileless JavaScript malware. To demonstrate this
threat, we designed and implemented JSLess as a PoC fileless malware. We designed
JSLess as a fileless polymorphic malware, with a dynamic malicious payload, that
applies both timing and event-based evasion.
3.4.1 Infection Scenarios
In our investigation, we define two main infection scenarios. The first scenario is
when the victim (web user) visits a malicious web server or application as illustrated
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Fig. 3.4.1: JavaScript Fileless Malware First Infection Scenario
in figure 3.4.1. In this case, the malicious web server will not show any malicious
behaviors until a specific event triggers the malicious behavior. In our demo, the
attack posts specific text messages on a common chat room. The message act as an
activation command to the malware. When the message is received the malware is
injected dynamically into the victim’s browser and starts running as part of the script
belonging to the public chat room.
The second infection scenario is when the malware compromises a legitimate web
application or server to infect the web browsers of the users who are currently visiting
the compromised website as illustrated in figure 3.4.2. In this case, both the website
and the website visitors are victims of the malware attack. The malware will open
a connection with the malicious server (e.g., C&C server) that hosts the malware to
download the malicious payload or receive a command from the malware authors to
execute on the victim browser.
Note that in both scenarios the malicious code infection/injection happens on the
client side, not the server side.
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Fig. 3.4.2: JavaScript Fileless Malware Second Infection Scenario
3.4.2 Operational Scenarios
JSLess is delivered to the victim’s web browser through a WebSocket connection.
When the victim visits a malicious web server, the WebSocket connection will be
part of the web app on the malicious server. However, if the malware authors prefer
to deliver JSLess by compromising a legitimate web app/server to increase in the
infection rate, then the WebSocket delivery code could be added into a third-party
JavaScript library (e.g. JQuery). Almost all modern web application relies on inte-
grating third-party JavaScript files. The WebSocket delivery code is relatively simple
(see the code in listing 3.3) and could easily be hidden in a malicious third-party script
library that is disguised as legitimate. Alternatively, the code could be inserted via
an HTML injection attack on a vulnerable site that does not correctly sanitize the
user input.
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MalWS = new WebSocket(’{{ WSSurl }}/ KeyCookieLog.js’);
MalWS.onmessage = function(e) {
sc = document.createElement(’script ’);
sc.type = ’text/JavaScript ’;





Listing 3.3: malicious payload delivered with websocket
The WebSocket API is used to deliver the malware source code in JavaScript to
the victim browser. Once the connection is opened, it downloads the JavaScript code
and uses it to create a new script element which is appended as a child to the HTML
file’s body element. This causes the downloaded script to be executed by the client’s
web browser.
Delivering the malware payload over WebSocket and dynamically injecting it into
the client’s web browser provides several advantages to malware authors. The fact
that the malware code is only observable when the web browser is executing the code
and mainly as a result of a trigger event provides one important fileless behavior
for the malware. The malicious code is never written to the victim’s file system.
Using WebSocket to deliver the malware payload does not raise any red flags by anti-
malware systems since it is a popular and common benign feature. Using benign
APIs is another essential characteristic of fileless malware.
The fact that JSLess can send any malicious payload for many attack vectors and
inject arbitrary JavaScript code with the option to obfuscate the injected malicious
code enables the design of polymorphic malware. All of these attributes make JSLess
a powerful malware threat that can easily evade detection by anti-malware systems.
For instance, a pure JavaScript logger could be quickly injected in the user’s browser
to captures user’s keystroke events and send them to the malware C&C server over
WebSocket. Note that benign and native JavaScript keystroke capturing APIs are
used which again will not raise any red flags. Figure 3.4.3 shows an example of an
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Fig. 3.4.3: Obfuscated JavaScript code injection
injected obfuscated JavaScript key logger that captures keystroke events and sends it
to the malware C&C server over WebSockect.
To utilize the victim’s system’s computation power or run the malicious scripts in
a separate thread from the main UI thread, JSless takes advantage of WebWorkers.
This allows JSless to run malicious activities that are computationally intensive, such
as cryptocurrency mining. The WebWorker script is downloaded from the C&C
server. The JavaScript code in listing 3.4 shows how the malicious WebWorker code
could be obtained as a blob object and initiated on the victim’s browser. Using the
importScripts and createObjectURL functions, we were able to load a script from a
different domain hosted on the different server and execute it in the background of
the benign web app.
blob = new Blob(["self.importScripts (’{{ HTTPSurl }}/ foo.js ’);"],
{type: ’application/JavaScript ’});
w = new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(blob));
Listing 3.4: Breaking Same-origin Policy with ImportScripts()
Until this point one limitation of JSless malware-framework is that fact that the
malware will terminate as soon as the user closes his web browser or navigates away
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from the compromised/malicious web server. This limitation is not specific to JSless,
it is the common behavior of any fileless malware. In fact, many malware authors
sacrifice the persistence of their malware infection by using fileless malware to avoid
detection and bypass anti-malware systems. However, that does not mean fileless
malware authors are not trying to come up with new methods and techniques to
make their fileless malware persistent. In our investigation to provide persistence for
JSless even if the user navigates away from the compromised/malicious web page or
closes the web browser. We take advantage of the ServiceWorker API to implement
a malware persistence technique with minimal footprint.
To achieve malware persistence, we used the WebSocket API to download a script
from the malicious server. After downloading the ServiceWorker registration code
from the malicious server, as shown in listing 3.1, it registers a sync event, as shown
in listing 3.5, to cause the downloaded code to execute and stay alive even if the user
has navigated away from the original page or closed the web browser. The malicious
code will continue to run and terminate normally when it is completed or abnormally
as result of exception, crash, or if the user restarts his machine. Note that when
we use ServiceWorker, a file is created and temporarily stored on the client machine
while the ServiceWorker is running. This is the only case where JSless will place a
file on the victim machine, and it is only needed for malware persistence.
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self.addEventListener(’sync’, function (event) {
if (event.tag === ’mal -service -worker ’) {
event.waitUntil(malServiceWorker ()
.then(( response) => {




function malServiceWorker () {
// Malicious activity can be performed here
}
Listing 3.5: ServiceWorker Implementation for malicious purpose
In our proof-of-concept implementation for the malware persistence with Service-
Worker, we implemented a MapReduce system. In this malicious MapReduce system,
all the current infected web browsers receive the map function and a chunk of the
data via WebSocket. The map function executes as a ServiceWorker and operates
over the data chunks sent by the malicious server. When the ServiceWorker finishes
executing the map function, it returns the result to the malicious server via Web-
Socket. When the malicious server receives the results from the ServiceWorker, it
performs the reduce phase and returns the final result to the malware author.
3.4.3 Attack Vectors
The ability to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript code allows JSless to support
a wide variety of malicious attacks. Here are the most common attacks that JSless
could execute:
3.4.3.1 Data Stealing
On infection JSless can easily collect keystrokes, cookie and web storage data, as
demonstrated in our PoC. Also, it could control multimedia devices and capture data
from a connected mic or webcam using native browser WebRTC APIs.
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3.4.3.2 DDoS
JSless malicious C&C server could orchestrate all the currently infected web browsers
to connect to a specific URL or web server to perform a DDoS attack. In this case,
JSless constructs a botnet of infected browsers to execute the DDoS attack.
3.4.3.3 Resource Consumption Attack
In this case, JSless could use the infected users’ browser to run computationally inten-
sive tasks such as cryptocurrency mining, password cracking, etc. The MapReduce
system we implement as part of JSless is an example of managing and running compu-
tationally intensive tasks. Also, beside the above attacks which we have implemented
in our JSless it is possible to perform other attacks like Click Fraud, RAT-in-the-
Browser (RitB) Attacks, and many other web-based attacks.
3.5 Experiment & Evaluation
In order to assess the identified JavaScript/HTML5 vulnerabilities and threats, we
developed JSless as a proof-of-concept fileless malware that is completely written
in JavaScript. We used the second injection scenario to test our fileless malware
implementation. For this purpose, we also implemented a web app that JSless will
compromise to infect the web browser of any user using the web app. The web app is
a shared chat board that allows users to register, post and receive messages to/from
a shared chat board. The web app and the JSless C&C server are implemented
in JavaScript using MEAN stack (MongoDB, ExpressJS, AngularJS, and Node.js).
The source code for the fileless malware and the target web app is available on our
GitHub/bitbucket repository for interested researchers and security analysts.
For the actual test, we deployed the target web app and the JSless C&C server
on Amazon Web Services (AWS). We used two AWS instances with two different
domains, one to host the target web app and the second to host JSLess C&C server.
We mainly tested two attack vectors, the data stealing attack and the resource con-
sumption attack.
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3.5.1 JS Malware Detection Tools
To our surprise, few anti-malware systems try to detect JavaScript malware. We
identified seven tools that we considered promising based on the techniques and the
technology they use for detection. Most of the tools apply both static and dynamic
analysis. Some of those tools are commercial, but they provide a free trial period
that includes all the commercial feature for a limited time. Table 3.5.1 shows the list
of tools we used in our study.
Tool Name Detection Technique License Website Detect JSLess
ReScan.pro static & dynamic commercial https://rescan.pro/ NO
VirusTotal static & dynamic free & commerical https://www.virustotal.com/ NO
SUCURI static commercial https://sucuri.net/ NO
SiteGuarding static commercial https://www.siteguarding.com/ NO
Web Inspector static & dynamic free https://app.webinspector.com/ NO
Quttera static & dynamic free & commercial https://quttera.com/ NO
AI-Bolit static & dynamic free & commercial https://revisium.com/aibo/ NO
Table 3.5.1: JavaScript and Web App Malware Detection Tools
None of the tools were able to detect JSless malicious behaviors. To confirm our
results we invited different teams from anti-malware service providers to inspect our
compromised web app. Only Fortiguard Labs (https://fortiguard.com/) confirmed
the malicious behaviors of JSless through manual analysis and full access to the
obfuscated source code of JSless since the automated tools raised a suspicious flag.
3.5.2 Detection & Mitigation
By reviewing the results from the detection tools and how those tools work, it is
obvious that detecting JSLess is very difficult. The use of WebSocket to inject and run
obfuscated malicious code makes it almost impossible for any static analysis tool to
detect JSLess, since the malicious payload does not exist at the time of static analysis.
The use of benign JavaScript/HTML5 APIs and features, in addition to the dynamic
injection behaviors, also make it very difficult for the current dynamic analysis tools
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to detect JSLess. Blocking or preventing new JavaScript/HTML5 APIs is not the
solution and it is not an option. In our opinion, a dynamic analysis technique that
implements continuous monitoring and is context-aware is the only approach that we
think could detect or mitigate fileless malware similar to JSLess.
3.5.3 Detection Tool Analysis Results
ReScan.Pro
ReScan.Pro is a cloud-based web application scanner which takes the URL of a web-
site and generates a report after scanning the website for web-based malware and
other web security issues. It explores the website and checks for infections, suspi-
cious content, obfuscated malware injections, hidden redirects and other web security
threats present. Analysis by ReScan.Pro is based on three main features.
1. Static Page Scanning: A combination of generic signature detection techniques
and heuristic detection. It uses signature and pattern-based analysis to identify
malicious code snippets and malware injections. It also looks for malicious and
blacklisted URLs in a proprietary database.
2. Behavioral Analysis: It imitates the website user’s possible behavior to evaluate
the intended action of implemented functionality.
3. Dynamic Page Analysis: performs dynamic web page loading analysis which
includes deobfuscation techniques to decode the obfuscated JavaScript in order
to identify runtime code injections and check for malware in external JavaScript
files.
We ran the experiment with the ReScan.Pro to test if it will detect the malicious
activities of JSless malware. It generated a well defined report after analyzing the
website with its static and dynamic features. The produced result indicated the
website is clean and no malicious activity has been found. ReScan.Pro could not
detect our JavaScript fileless malware.
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Web Inspector
This tool runs a website security scan and provides a report of a given website after
it is provided with its URL. Its security scanner is bit different from others because it
performs both malware and vulnerabilities scans together. This tool claims to provide
five different detection techniques; Honeypot Engine, Antivirus Detection, BlackList
Checking, SSL Checking, and Analyst Research.
In our experiment our JavaScript fileless malware was able to successfully deceive
this malware detection tool as well. Web Inspector’s report indicated that no malware
was detected.
Sucuri
Sucuri is another tool that offers a website security evaluation with a free online scan-
ner. This scanning tool searches for various indicators of compromise, which includes
malware, drive-by downloads, defacement, hidden redirects, conditional malware, etc.
Sucuri claim to uses static techniques with intelligent signatures which are based on
code anomalies and heuristic detection to detect malicious behaviour. Server side
monitoring is another service provided by them which can be hosted on the compro-
mised server to look for backdoors, phishing attack vulnerabilities, and other security
issues by scanning the files present on the server. Moreover, Sucuri also provides a
scanning API as a paid feature.
Testing Sucuri online scanner with JSLess, we found that it failed to detect out
fileless malware, indicating that there is ”No Malware Found” as well as indicating a
medium security risk. However, this is due to Insecure SSL certificates, not from the
detection of our fileless malware.
Quttera
Quttera is yet another website scanner that attempts to identify malware and sus-
picious activities in web applications. Its malware detector contains non-signature
based approaches which attempt to uncover traffic re-directs, generic malware, and
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security weakness exploits. It also claims to provide real-time detection of shell-codes,
obfuscated JavaScript, malicious iframes, traffic re-directs and other threats. Here
too, the website scanner failed to detect our JavaScript fileless malware.
VirusTotal
VirusTotal is a popular free malware inspection tool which offers a number of services
including websites scanning. They aggregate different tools which cover a wide variety
of techniques, such as heuristic, signature based analysis, domain blacklisting services,
and more. A detailed report is provided after completing the scan which not only
indicates the malicious content present in a website but also exhibits the detection
label by each engine.
We scanned our compromised web app with VirusTotal which used 66 different
malware detection engines, and none of were able to detect that the web app is
compromised, as shown in figure.
AI-BOLIT
AI-BOLIT is an antivirus/malware scanner for website browsing and hosting. It uses
heuristic analysis and other “patented AI algorithms” to find malware. We used it to
scan our JSLess malware scripts. However, it failed to detect JSLess and generated
a false positive when it consider some of the core modules of NodeJS as malicious
JavaScripts.
3.6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this chapter, we confirmed several threat-vectors that exist in new JavaScript and
HTML5 features. We demonstrated how an attacker could abuse benign features
and APIs in JavaScript and HTML5 to implement fileless malware with advanced
evasion capabilities. We showed a practical implementation of a fileless JavaScript
malware that to our knowledge is the first of its kind. The proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of the proposed JS fileless malware successfully bypasses several well-known
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anti-malware systems that are designed to detect JavaScript and web malware. In ad-
dition, third-party malware analyst teams confirmed our finding and proved that the
proposed malware bypasses automated malware detection systems. From this par-
ticular study, we conclude that the current static and dynamic analysis techniques
are limited if not useless against fileless malware attacks. Moreover, fileless malware
attacks are not limited to PowerShell and Windows environment. In our opinion,
any computing environment that enables running and executing arbitrary JavaScript
code is vulnerable to fileless attacks.
Our future work could be summarized in three different directions. First, we will
continue extending the malicious behaviors of JSLess and investigate the possibility
of more advanced attacks using other new benign features and APIs from JavaScript
and HTML5. Second, we will design a new detection technique to detect advanced JS
malware and mainly fileless JS malware like the proposed JSLess. We plan to imple-
ment dynamic analysis approaches that continually monitor and analyze JavaScript
and Browser activities. Finally, our third research direction will focus on investigat-
ing the fileless malware threat in unconventional computing environments, such as
the Internet of Things, in-memory computing environments (e.g., Redis, Hazelcast,
Spark, etc.), and so on. We hope our research will help to raise awareness of the
emerging unconventional malware threats.
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4.1 Introduction
Adopting sophisticated machine learning techniques for malware detection or other
cyber attack detection and prevention systems in a production environment is a chal-
lenge. This is because most of the time it is not possible to understand how machine
learning systems make their detection decisions. In the malware detection domain,
machine learning models can be trained to distinguish between benign binaries and
malware, or between different malware families. The advantage of using machine
learning models is that they are less sensitive to minute changes in malware binaries
and can therefore detect unseen samples so long as they are designed and trained to
detect characteristics common across seen and unseen samples. Furthermore, their
learnt relationships can be used to determine relevant features for a classification,
limiting the amount of data malware analyst must sift through to determine the
functionality of a malicious binary. However, there are several drawbacks that must
be addressed before their full potential can be realized in the malware detection do-
main. Firstly, due to the quick evolving nature of malware, the models must be made
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efficient to train and update frequently when new malware families are discovered.
Secondly, it is possible to create specially crafted “adversarial samples” which take
advantage of peculiarities in the models learnt relationships to bypass the detector
with relatively inconsequential changes to the binary. Finally, given the high degree
of risk involved with classification errors, the models must provide a reason for their
decisions in order to improve performance and increase trust in the model and its
predictions.
The process of providing reasons for a machine learning model’s predictions is
known as interpretation. Interpretation in this setting should provide several key
benefits. Firstly, due to the high cost of classification error, a low false positive and
false negative rate is a must, and therefore these systems must be robust. Further,
robustness makes it more difficult for malware authors to create adversarial malware
to bypass the detector. A model is said to be robust if small changes in input do
not cause large changes in output such as a different classification. Second, the high
risk necessitates a high degree of model confidence. Therefore, interpretation must
provide evidence that the model has learnt something which can be corroborated with
industry knowledge. This also goes hand in hand with the first requirement as an
interpretation which can show a model is robust can improve model confidence as
well. Additionally, the interpretation should aid malware analysts in down stream
tasks such as determining the functionality of a malware binary.
Machine learning interpretation can be broadly separated into two categories. One
is model agnostic techniques which are independent of the type of model which they
are interpreting and rely solely on the input and output of the model. The other,
which we will be using in this chapter, are model specific techniques, which use specific
elements of the model such as learnt weights or decision rules in order to provide an
interpretation of a prediction. Interpretations themselves can be divided into global
and local interpretations. Global interpretations provide an interpretation that is
applicable across the entire feature space. Meanwhile local interpretations apply to
only a single example or a small subset of the feature space. Some interpretation
techniques provide only one type of interpretation while others provide both.
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In this chapter we explore the interpretability of machine learning based malware
classifiers in relation to the goals of model robustness, confidence in model predic-
tions, and aiding the process of determining the functionality of a malware sample. We
train a logistic regression model, random forest, and a neural network on a Microsoft
data set containing the hexadecimal representations of malware binaries belonging
to several different malware families. We then apply model specific interpretation
techniques to provide both a global and local interpretation of each of the models.
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate interpretability techniques in practice
on machine learning based malware detectors. We also try to evaluate the effective-
ness of existing interpretability techniques in the malware analysis domain in terms
of their usefulness to malware analysts in a practical setting. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the only work which explores the application of machine learning
interpretability techniques in the malware analysis domain.
4.2 Literature Review
In the last decade, with the increasingly massive data sets machine learning algo-
rithms are being used on, and the growing complexity of the algorithms, the prediction
process of these algorithms has become so non-intuitive that traditional analysis tech-
niques no longer suffice. Analysis being necessary for a number of practical and legal
concerns has caused research to now shift towards machine learning interpretability.
Christoph Molnar [11] put together a summary of machine learning interpreta-
tion methods in which he outlines a basic approach for the interpretation of Linear
Regression models (of course the same approach can be applied to linear SVM’s, Shi-
rataki et al. [18]) where a feature’s contribution to a prediction is the product of its
value and weight. For logistic regression he shows that when the jth feature value is
incremented by 1, then the quotient of the predicted odds of the sample belonging to
the positive class after the increase over the predicted odds of the sample belonging
to the positive class before the increase is equal to eβj , where βj is the weight of
feature j. Alternatively, this means that a unit increase in feature j results in the
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predicted odds increasing by ((eβj − 1) ∗ 100)%. He goes on to discuss the seemingly
trivial interpretation of decision trees as the conjunction of the conditions described
in the nodes along a predictions path to a leaf node. Similarly, for rule list models,
an “explanation” is simply restating the rule or combination of rules which lead to a
decision.
However, the evaluation of a model’s complexity is closely tied with its explana-
tion’s comprehensibility, especially for rule set models, linear models, and tree mod-
els. Given the following complexity definitions, the explanation approaches discussed
above could be too complex for highly dimensional datasets. Marco Ribeiro et al. [15]
define the complexity of a linear model as the number of non-zero weights and the
complexity of a decision tree as the depth of the tree. Meanwhile, Otero and Freitas
[12] defined the complexity of a list of rules as the average number of conditions evalu-
ated to classify a set of test data. They referred to this as the “prediction-explanation
size”.
There has also been work done on the interpretability of neural networks(NNs)
such as the Layer-wise Relevance Propagation introduced in [3] as a set of constraints.
The constraints ensure that the total relevance is preserved from one layer to another
as well as that the relevance of each node is equal to the sum of relevance contribu-
tions from its input nodes which in turn is equal to the sum of relevance contributions
to its output nodes. Any decomposition function following these constraints is con-
sidered a type of Layer-wise Relevance Propagation. In [19], Shrikumar et al. propose
DeepLIFT which attributes to each node a contribution to the difference in prediction
from a reference prediction by back propagating the difference in predication scaled
by the difference in intermediate and initial inputs.
Moving on to model agnostic methods, Friedman in [6] used Partial Dependence
Plots (PDP) to show the marginal effect a feature has in a predictive model. Similarly,
Goldstein et al. [8] used Individual Conditional Expectation (ICE) plots to show a
curve for each sample in the data set where one or two features are free variables while
the rest of the features remain fixed. Since ICE plots and PDPs do not work well
with strongly correlated features, Deniel W. Apley et al. [2] proposed Accumulated
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Local Effects plots to display the average local effect a feature has on predictions.
The H-statistic was used by Friedman and Popescu in [7] (equations 44-46) to pro-
vide a statistical estimate of the interaction strength between features by measuring
the fraction of variance not captured by the effects of single variables. Feature Im-
portance was measured by Breiman [4] as the increase in model error after a feature’s
values are permuted (a.k.a. permutation importance).
Marco Ribeiro et al. in [15] defined a version of the surrogate method which can
explain individual predictions using an approach called Local Interpretable Model-
agnostic Explanations (LIME) which trains an interpretable classifier by heavily
weighing samples nearer to a sample of interest. Tomi Peltola [13] extended this work
with KL-LIME, which generated local interpretable probabilistic models for Bayesian
predictive models (although the method can also be applied to non-Bayesian proba-
bilistic models) by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the predictive model
and the interpretable model. This has the added benefit of providing explanations
that account for model uncertainty. Strumbelj et al. [20] detailed how to describe
the contributions made by each feature to a prediction for a specific instance using
Shapely Values, a concept adopted from coalitional game theory.
Finally, there are Example-Based methods such as the method put forward by
Wachter et al. in [21] which produce interpretations by finding counter-factual ex-
amples which are samples with a significant difference in prediction, whose features
are relatively similar to the sample of interest, by minimizing a loss function. The
found sample is then used to explain what small changes would cause the original
prediction to change meaningfully. There is also the MMD-critic algorithm by Kim
et al. [9] which finds Prototypes (well represented examples) and Criticisms (poorly
represented examples) in the dataset. To find examples in the training data which
have a strong effect on a trained linear regression model (i.e. influential instances)
Cook [5] proposed Cook’s distance, a measure of the difference in predictions made
by a linear regression model (however the measure can be generalized to any model)
trained with and without an instance of interest. Koh and Liang [10] put forward
a method for estimating the influence of a specific instance without retraining the
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model as long as the model has a twice differentiable loss function.
4.3 Method
Training and classification were done on a data set of 10,896 malware files belonging
to 9 different malware families.1 The data set is discussed in [16]. Each sample
consists of the hexadecimal representation of the malware’s binary content. The class
details are summed up in table 4.3.1.
Table 4.3.1: Class distribution in Data Set
Class No. Family Sample Count Type
1 Ramnit 1541 Worm
2 Lollipop 2478 Adware
3 Kelihos ver3 2942 Backdoor
4 Vundo 475 Trojan
5 Simda 42 Backdoor
6 Tracur 751 TrojanDownloader
7 Kelihos ver1 398 Backdoor
8 Obfuscator.ACY 1228 obfuscated malware
9 Gatak 1013 Backdoor
Based on other work on the the same data set, we decided to use n-grams as
features. N-grams are sequences of words of length n which occur in a body of text.
However, in our case the n-grams are sequences of bytes of length n which occur in a
binary. The length of n-gram we settled on was 6 because they were shown to preform
well in [14], however our approach can work with n-grams of arbitrary length. We
extracted the 6-gram features from the hex representations of the malware files by
1The data set was downloaded from https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification/
data
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obtaining the entire list of 6-grams present in the data set, and the number of files each
6-gram appeared in. This resulted in over 2,536,629,413 candidate features. Next,
any 6-gram which did not appear in at least 100 files was removed from consideration,
bringing the feature set size down to 817,785. This was done because [14] also showed
that selection by frequency is an effective way to reduce the initial feature set size and
a computationally cheap approach was needed considering the number of features.
Next, feature vectors were created for each of the malware samples so that a more
sophisticated feature selection method can be preformed. This was done by searching
for the selected 6-gram feature in a binary and setting the corresponding value in that
binary’s feature vector to 1 if the binary did contain the 6-gram, and 0 otherwise.
To select the features for the logistic regression model, Chi2 was used because it can
detect if a categorical feature is independent of a predicted categorical variable (in
this case our class) and is therefore irrelevant to our classifier. For the neural network
and random forest, Mutual Information (MI) was used because it can detect the more
complex dependencies between a feature and a sample’s classification which can be
taken advantage of by a neural network or random forest. Since the feature set was
still very large, the Chi2 and MI scores had to be calculated in batches. This was done
by splitting the data set into 20 batches, each with the same distribution of classes,
and averaging out the resulting scores for each feature. Next, the features with Chi2
scores above 330 or MI scores above 0.415 were selected. This brought the feature set
size down to 8867 in the case of the logistic regression model and to 9980 in the case
of the neural network and random forest. The feature set size was determined based
off other work using n-grams to classify the same data set. We did not attempt to
find an optimal feature set size as our primary focus was model interpretation.
Next, the models were trained on their respective feature sets. To find the best
parameters for the logistic regression model and train the model, grid search with
5-fold cross validation was used, yielding C = 10 and tolerance = 0.0001. The value
of C inversely determines the strength of regularization, that is, smaller values of C
cause more feature weights in the classifier to be set to 0, a value of 0 corresponds
to no regularization, and values above 0 encourage the classifier to use more fea-
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tures. Tolerance determines the minimum change in error, from one iteration of the
optimization algorithm to the next, that causes the algorithm to terminate training.
Similarly for random forest, finding the best parameters and training was done with
grid search with 5-fold cross validation as well. The number of trees found to preform
best was 300 and the and the minimum samples per leaf found to preform best was
0.01% of the total number of samples. The grid search with cross validation, logistic
regression model, and the random forest model were implemented using the scikit
python library.
For the neural network the data was split into a training and a test set each with
the same class distribution. This was done because the extra parameters in a neural
network require a larger data set to learn more abstract patterns and splitting it up
into many folds might have stifled this process. The neural network consisted of an
input layer with one neuron per feature, an output layer with one neuron per class
using the sigmoid activation function, and a hidden layer consisting of 40 neurons
using the tanh activation function. 40 neurons was chosen because that number was
found to preform the best after testing with various other configurations. There were
also no bias units to aid in interpretation. The neural network was implemented using
the Keras python library.
After training and testing the three models, the logistic regression model was
interpreted by examining the weights used by the classifier. The random forest was
interpreted by examining the feature importance as well as using the treeInterpreter
python library [17] to obtain feature contributions to a particular prediction. In
the case of the Neural network, the iNNvestigate python library by [1] was used to
preform LRP to get the relevances of each node in the model for interpretation. The
balanced accuracy on the left out fold was 96.19% for the logistic regression model
and 96.97% for the random forest. The balanced accuracy on the test set was 94.22%
for the neural network. A discussion of the model interpretations follows in the next
section.
63
4. INTERPRETING ML MALWARE DETECTORS WHICH USE N-GRAM FEATURES
4.4 Interpretation
4.4.1 Logistic Regression Model Interpretation
The logistic regression model uses a one-vs-rest classification scheme whereby for each
class, a constituent model is trained to classify a sample as either that class, or not
that class, and therefore we are actually dealing with nine separate logistic regression
models each making binary classifications. For this reason we cannot preform the
typical global interpretation of the overall multi-class model by examining the weights
since the weights should be different for each of the binary models. However, we can
gain insight of the importance of each feature by averaging these weights across the
9 constituent binary models. For this we take the average of the absolute values of
the weights. This is because if a feature contributes positively for one constituent
binary classifier and negatively for another, then the weights would cancel each other
out during averaging which would falsely give the impression that the feature was not
important in the overall multi-class model. Table 4.4.1 shows the largest 15 averages
of the absolute feature weights.
Looking at the table 4.4.1, we can see that three 6-grams are relatively heavily
weighted, 00E404000000, 0083C4088B4D, and C78530FDFFFF. Recall from section
4.2 that for logistic regression, when the jth feature value is incremented by a value of
1, then the predicted odds increase by ((eβj−1)∗100)%, where βj is the learnt weight
of the jth feature. In our case we are using binary feature values where a 1 indicates
the presence of a 6-gram and 0 indicates its absence, so we interpret the weights as
follows. When the 6-gram corresponding to the jth feature is present, the predicted
odds increase by ((eβj −1)∗100)%. One may be tempted to apply this to the weights
in table 4.4.1, but these are averaged absolute weights across all 9 constituent binary
classifiers. Further, negative weights do not cause a decrease in the predicted odds
that is proportional to a positive weight with the same absolute value due to the
shape of the function f(x) = ex − 1. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to say the
average absolute effect of some 6-gram corresponds to a (eavgj − 1)% change in the
predicted odds, where avgj is the average absolute weight of feature j. Thus a global
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Table 4.4.1: Max 15 Absolute Weights of the Logistic Regression Model Averaged
Across All 9 Binary Sub-classifiers
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interpretation of a multi-class one-vs-rest logistic regression model using n-grams in
confined to vague statements about which n-grams are important based solely off
their average absolute weights, which is not very useful in a practical setting.
Next we will examine the max weights for a constituent binary model. This will
allow us to make conclusions on what features the model uses to detect a specific
class of malware in the data set. Furthermore, we will be able to determine exactly
the change in predicted odds that the presence of an n-gram causes. For the sake of
brevity, we will examine just the binary model for class 3, corresponding to the Keli-
hos ver3 family of malware, as all three models performed well for this class but the
same process can be followed for the other constituent binary models corresponding
to other classes. Table 4.4.2 shows the max 15 weights of the classifier for class 3.
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In table 4.4.2 we can see three 6-grams have relatively large weights. This means
these n-grams are most strongly associated with class 3 and in this case, since we are
looking at only the weights for a single binary classifier, we can use our interpretation
from above. That is, when the 6-gram corresponding to the jth feature is present, the
predicted odds increase by ((eβj − 1) ∗ 100)%. For example we can say the presence
of 00008B5DE43B, increases the predicted odds of a sample belonging to class 3 by
((e4.3916−1)∗100)% = 7977%. At first glance this number may seem excessive but in
order to make good sense of it we must also determine what the predicted odds of a
sample belonging to class 3 are when this 6-grams are not present, using a reference
sample. For this we use a zero-vector corresponding to a sample where none of the
6-grams used as features are present. Since the dot product of a zero vector and
the weight vector is zero, we only need to take the sigmoid of the intercept of the
binary model for class 3 to determine the predicted probability of the reference vector
belonging to class 3. The intercept is -4.2843, thus the predicted probability of the
reference sample belonging to class 3 is sigmoid(−4.28426) = 0.01360. Next we must
convert this to odds with 0.01360/(1−0.01360) = 0.01378. This means a sample with
no feature 6-grams present except 00008B5DE43B increases the odds from 0.01378 by
7977% to 0.01378 + (0.01378 ∗ 79.77) = 1.11301 predicted odds, or a 0.5267 predicted
probability, of belonging to class 3. Thus we see that because of the intercept, the
large weight of this feature does not necessarily guarantee a classification into class
3.
We can get a better idea of the robustness of the model by checking the number of
6-grams which play a significant role in the classification of a sample into class 3. This
is because robustness is a measure of how tolerant a model is to small changes in input.
Therefore, if the number of 6-grams which play a significant role is large, then a large
number of changes in input will be required for a change in classification, thus giving
us confidence in the model’s robustness. However, if the number of significant features
is low then only a small number of changes in input will be required for a change in
classification, changes that may be easy and inconsequential for malware authors to
make. Thus the robustness of the model would be called into question. In our case,
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20 features have weights greater than or equal to about 0.59. 6-grams with weights
above this number increase the predicted odds by ((e0.59 − 1) ∗ 100)% ≈ 80%. Since
the predicted odds of the reference example belonging to class 3 is 0.01378, this means
about 11 such features can cause a sample to be classified as class 3 with about 90%
predicted probability. This may indicate that the model is putting too much emphasis
on just a few highly weighted 6-grams. To test this we can reclassify samples belong to
class 3 with the highest weighted 6-grams set to 0. In our case, we set the nine highest
weighted features to 0 for all samples. This required 22863 changes to the feature
array, and the result was only 24 more misclassifications, 17 of which belonged to class
3, which has 2942 samples. Here, we encounter a specification issue. Currently, there
is no formally defined metric to measure robustness quantitatively and once there is, a
threshold for acceptable robustness will be application specific. We leave a definition
of a robustness metric to future work, however, given that robustness is defined in
terms of a model’s tolerance to changes in input, and that tolerance to changes of
insignificant features is irrelevant, we can be confident that this approach can give us
an idea of our model’s robustness. The models robustness becomes more clear when
compared with other models. For example, if setting the same number of features to 0
in another model resulted in more or less misclassification, then we can say that model
is less or more robust respectively than our logistic regression model Therefore, we can
confidently say our approach gave an idea of model robustness for class 3. One can
increase the model’s robustness by further training the classifier with samples which
have the highly weighted 6-grams removed. This would force the classifier to learn a
more diverse set of features which correspond to class 3, meaning that more changes
would be required to change a prediction to or from class 3. Thus by observing the
important features, we can improve the models robustness to small changes in the
input. A similar strategy can be followed for the most negatively weighted features.
If there are features with too large negative weights, then a detector can be fooled
by intentionally adding these 6-grams. Further training the classifier by adding the
large negative weighted 6-grams to samples labeled class 3 will force the classifier to
learn not to negate positively weighted features with one or a small set of 6-grams.
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Therefore we can conclude that examining the weights in the manner we have done
here can be useful for debugging logistic regression models leveraging n-grams. This
interpretation is still global in that it encompasses the entire feature space, however,
it must be repeated for each class. On the upside though, the global interpretation
doubles as a local interpretation as the relationship between the presence of an n-
gram and the change in the predicted odds holds across the entire data set for each
sample.
Furthermore, this method for finding important n-grams features can be helpful
in a practical setting as it can be used to aid malware analysts in down stream tasks.
A malware binary’s functionality can be more easily determined by implementing
a method which automatically disassembles binaries and highlights the code which
corresponds to the most heavily weighted n-grams that are present in the binary.
This approach can also improve confidence in the model if the highlighted code’s
functionality is corroborated with industry knowledge. Both these advantages require
another interpretation step of mapping feature values from the feature space to the
domain space (i.e. mapping n-grams to the corresponding code) which is not the
focus of this chapter. The downside to this interpretation approach is that it is
specific to logistic regression models only, and unlike models such as neural networks
or decisions tress, logistic regression models are not easily capable of learning more
complex relationships between features and target values.
4.4.2 Random Forest Interpretation
In the case of the random forest, interpretation is more difficult. It is easy in a more
general sense, in that we can get the feature importance scores, shown below in table
4.4.3, and use these to determine what features are generally most important, but
getting a more fine grained interpretation is a challenge as the random forest is an
ensemble of often hundreds of different decision trees.
Table 4.4.3 gives us a great idea of the model robustness. Since the total feature
importance is always equal to 1, we can be sure that the model isn’t relying on just a
small number of features to make predictions because the 15 most important features
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only accounts for 0.9% of the total importance. Additionally, the feature importance
steadily declines without one feature or a small group of features overshadowing
the rest. Unfortunately, general statements about robustness which do not provide
much utility to the malware analyst in a practical setting are the most we can say
with a global interpretation. However considering a single example can give us more
information, albeit only locally.
Interpretation of a Single Sample with Random Forest
With random forest, a local interpretation of a single example is difficult as a classifi-
cation decision is the result of a vote amongst many different decision trees. However,
here we find the tree with the highest predicted probability that a specific example
belongs to its actual class. Then we use the tree interpreter library [17] to break down
the contributions of each 6-gram feature. In our case we followed this procedure for
sample 4WM7aZDLCmlosUBiqKOx and found that the 6-gram 002500000031 and
the bias contributed 97.3% of the total feature importance. One may be tempted to
think this means the model is relying on only a single feature however this is just
one tree out of many which have heavily varying structures. Thus, changing this
feature may not cause many of the other tree’s predictions to change, such is the
advantage of using random forests over single decisions trees. The significance of the
resulting feature contribution is two fold. Firstly, the model designer can find the
code corresponding to 002500000031 in the assembly code and determine weather the
functionality of the code corroborates industry knowledge. If it does, then this can be
used with other examples to improve model confidence. Secondly, by finding 6-grams
in the constituent decision trees of the random forest model which are significant to
a prediction, a process can be automated to disassemble the input file and highlight
the code that corresponds to these significant 6-grams, aiding in malware analysis.
The downside to this approach is that the random forest is made up of many dif-
ferent decision trees, many of which should all be predicting the correct class, so an
automated process which collects significant 6-grams from these constituent trees and
highlights the corresponding code may provide an overwhelming number of results.
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This is because well over a hundred trees will be contributing at least a few 6-grams,
meaning that potentially 100’s of snippets of code will be highlighted to the analyst.
Once again we are faced with the problem of mapping the feature values to the do-
main, however this should not be too tall a task and we leave this challenge to future
work.
4.4.3 Neural Network Model Interpretation
For our global interpretation of the Neural Network model, we used LRP to deter-
mine the most relevant input nodes for classification. LRP was preformed in this
experiment using iNNvestigate python library by [1]. First we found the relevances
of the input nodes for each sample and then we averaged the absolute values of these
relevances for the entire data set. This was done because one input node may be pos-
itively contributing to one output nodes prediction while negatively contributing to
another, causing the input nodes relevances to cancel out during averaging and giving
false impressions about the feature set. Table 4.4.4 shows the largest 15 averages of
the absolute relevances.
In Table 4.4.4 we can see two values had significantly higher relevances than the
rest, 000000000400 and 0000000000FF, and are therefore important for the models
classification. Additionally, we can see many of the features which appear here are also
in the top 15 most important 6-grams for the random forest. This result partially
validates our technique for finding important 6-gram features in a neural network
which to the best of our knowledge is a novel use of LRP in this domain. This gives
us a general idea of the importance of features used by the model but, just like in the
case of the other two models, we are still confined to vague general statements about
a feature’s importance. However, this time it is due to the complexity of the model.
Next we will examine the max relevances for a particular class. In this case we
average the relevances for each node across all samples which were correctly classified
as class 3. Table 4.4.5 shows the max 15 average relevances for class 3.
In Table 4.4.5 we can see five of the features which appear here are also in the
top 15 highest weighted 6-grams for the binary logistic regression classifier for class
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Table 4.4.4: Max Average Absolute Relevances
















Bolded 6-grams also present in Table 4.4.3
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Bolded 6-grams also present in Table 4.4.2
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3. This result also partially validates our technique for finding important 6-gram
features in a neural network for a single class. In this case we are still confined to
general statements about a features importance for a specific class. However, we can
get an idea of the model’s robustness by setting the features with the highest average
relevances for class 3 to 0 for all correctly classified samples in class 3. If the model
relies heavily on only the presence of these 6-grams, then the class accuracy will drop
drastically, however if we have a similar class accuracy as before, then it is unlikely
that the features with a lesser average relevance would have a larger effect on the
class accuracy and therefore we can somewhat confidently say the model is robust for
this class. In our experiment the top 4 highest average relevance features were all set
to 0 and it resulted in no further misclassifications. Therefore we can say our model
is somewhat robust for class 3. This result is somewhat helpful in a practical setting
as a malware analyst can use this technique to ensure the robustness of their model,
but not much else.
Interpretation of a Single Sample with Neural Network
Next we’ll further explore the neural network’s predictions for samples belonging to
class 3 by taking the test sample with the highest predicted probability of belonging
to class 3, sample 4WM7aZDLCmlosUBiqKOx, and examining relevances for this
sample in order to provide a local interpretation. In doing so we can see what the
internal nodes are learning. First we determine the internal node relevances for this
sample. The library used for this experiment did not have a built in method to
determine the relevances of internal layer nodes so we created a second neural network
that was a duplicate of the last two layers of the original neural network. We then
obtained the value of the second layer nodes before the activation function is applied
when classifying this sample. That is, if W 1 is the weight matrix for the connections
between layer 1 and layer 2, and X1 is the outputs of layer 1, then we obtained
X1 ·W 1. We then inputted X1 ·W 1 into our second neural network and preformed
LRP to get the relevances of the first layer of our second neural network which are
equivalent to the relevances of the hidden layer in our original neural network. The
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most relevant node by a substantial margin was the 40th node in the hidden layer
with a relevance of 0.61 and an activation of -0.99996614. Since this node is in layer
2 we will denote it with n240. Next we created a third neural network that had two
layers. The first was identical to layer 1 of our original neural network, the second
was just the single node, n240, from the original neural network, and the weight matrix
for the connections from layer 1 to layer 2 of this new network is W 1(40) were W
1
(i) is the
9980-dimensional weight vector for connections from layer 1 to the ith node in layer
2 of the original neural network. In this way we were able to obtain the relevances
of the input layer to only the activation of n240 in the hidden layer. Table 4.4.6 shows
the max 10 node relevances for the activation of n240 in the hidden layer.












In table 4.4.6 we can see that many of the 6-grams have similar relevance’s which
slowly decrease. This corroborates our results when examining class 3 as a whole
since the similar relevances across many input nodes indicates that many features
are responsible for a classification which is to be expected when a model is robust
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to changes in the input data. One can automate the process of preforming LRP on
specific examples to find relevant input nodes, both for the entire model and for a
specific internal node possibly showing what the internal node is learning. From there
highlighting the disassembled code which corresponds to the most relevant nodes can
help malware analyst either determine the functionality of the file or show that the
model has learnt something which corresponds to industry knowledge, thus improving
confidence in the model.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we demonstrated techniques for the interpretation of malware detectors
which leverage n-grams as features. We’ve shown that it is possible to interpret a
neural network, a logistic regression model, and a random forest, with the objectives
of debugging and creating robust models, improving model confidence, and aiding
malware analysts in downstream tasks. For the logistic regression model, examining
the weights was all that was needed to meet these goals. However, although straight
forward to interpret, the model was less expressive then the other two considered.
The random forest required slightly more work for analysis but it was also possible
to get a meaningful local interpretation that helped with the above stated goals.
The downside here was that the random forest interpretation must consider many of
the constituent trees to be thorough, which can be time consuming and provide too
verbose results. The neural network interpretation was much more intensive but by
using layer-wise relevance propagation it was possible to determine the relevance or
significance of different n-grams across the data set, across a specific class, and for a
single example or for a single node. Thus, we were able to provide a global and local
interpretation which was somewhat useful in a practical setting since by using these
relevances it was then possible to get an idea of the robustness of the model and build
confidence or aid in downstream analysis of samples.
Over all it was possible to satisfy our interpretation objectives for each model
but the ubiquitous trade off between the interpretability and the expressivity of the
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model was still present. Additionally, n-grams in and of themselves seem slightly
problematic as it is not easy to determine what a n-gram corresponds to on its own,
without considering a single example for context. So providing a global interpretation
of a n-gram in order to show what the model has learnt is difficult. To this end it
would be advantageous to include human readable features as well or other features
which can be easily interpreted in a manner that doesn’t require examining a specific
real example.
For future work the interpretation of other models using other feature sets is a
must. Additionally, a metric to quantify the robustness of a malware detector is
needed for more direct comparison.
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The significantly increased processing power since the early 2000’s not only led to
increase use in machine learning but also caused the algorithms being used to grow
more complex. Further, the increased availability of large data sets provides the
opportunity to learn more complex patterns. This has lead to a significant increase
in the ability of machine learning models in image classification and computer vision
tasks where architectures such as the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) can now
out preform humans in some scenarios. As discussed earlier, Machine learning has also
grown more popular in the malware detection and analysis domain. However, the high
performance of machine learning in machine vision has now lead to the adaptation of
image classification algorithms, such as the CNN, in the malware detection domain
as well. However, with these more complex classification algorithms, it becomes
increasingly difficult to understand what exactly a model has learnt.
Machine learning techniques not used for image classification have also been ap-
plied to augment both of the traditional malware detection approaches (i.e. static
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and dynamic analysis), as we have scene in chap 4. This typically involves a com-
plex feature engineering and extraction phase which has to be fine tuned for different
systems and different malware families. This incentivized the use of deep learning
in order to automate some portion of the feature extraction process. Further more,
architectures which are designed to make use of the ordinal information contained
within the input sample have been favoured. This is because the order in which in-
structions appear in a binary is massively significant in determining its functionality.
Thus, recurrent neural networks (RNN) which have typically been used for natural
language processing are an obvious candidate. However, RNNs have trouble dealing
with long term dependencies within the sample they are classifying. Further, [10]
made the observation that malware converted to images belonging to the same family
have visual similarities between them and have dissimilarities with malware belong-
ing to different families which can be distinguished by the human eye. This caused
some researchers to turn to CNNs as they also take advantage of ordinal information
contained in the input data as well as use the spatial information contained in images.
As discussed earlier, the downside to such complex approaches is the resulting
models are not easy to understand or lack interpretability. Malware analyst prefer
explainable solutions as they must fine tune their systems in order to limit the number
of false positives and false negatives. However, if you do not know what the model
has learnt, or why it is making a prediction, then it is difficult to make adjustments
as you are essentially working with a black box. Further, the inherent risk involved
with new technologies means that stake holders must be convinced the model is
learning something relevant to the task at hand. This was much easier with traditional
approaches where the classification was an easy to understand process, however now it
is no longer evident how the model is making a classification. Additionally, a growing
problem in malware analysis is the large amounts of data one must sift through to
determine the functionality of a malware binary. Patterns the model learnt should
be used to help with this issue.
If a fine grained interpretation of a malware classification model can be obtained,
one which isolates specific lines of code as significant for a classification of a single
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sample (i.e. a local interpretation), then this interpretation can be used to aid in
down stream tasks such as highlighting code snippets which significantly contributed
to a classification decision. This would give malware analysts a starting point and
help limit the amount of time and effort needed to determine the functionality of a
malware sample. Further, isolated lines of code which are deemed significant can be
used to detect when a model is learning irrelevant relationships. These can then be
corrected to decrease false positive and false negative rates. Lastly, if these significant
lines of code can be shown to corroborate industry knowledge then this can show
the model has learnt something which is relevant and help improve confidence from
stakeholders. This would not only put stakeholders minds at ease but would increase
industry adoption for this emergent technology.
Thus, in this chapter we focus on augmenting the approach of using a CNN trained
on the image representation of malware binaries for static analysis. We do this with
the goal of providing a fine grained local interpretation of prediction results while
maintaining good classification performance relative to similar models in the literature
as well as keeping the simple automated feature extraction from raw data which
CNNs provide. We start with a brief review of the application of CNNs to malware
classification, we then detail the specifics of our method for generating and classifying
malware images and interpreting our classification results. Next we have a discussion
of our results and end with conclusions and future work. To the best of our knowledge,
the interpretation approach used in this work has not been done before.
5.2 Literature Review
Recently there has been some interest in applying CNNs to malware classification.
In [20], they were able to achieve a 96.7% accuracy classifying malicious binaries
against benign binaries. This was accomplished by first mapping op code sequences
of length 2 from a sample to a 2 dimensional feature map where the value of each
“pixel” in the feature map was determined by multiplying the information gain of
the corresponding op code sequence in the sample by the probability of said op code
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given said sample. Next the resulting “images” where enhanced to create a larger
contrast between the malicious and benign samples before applying a CNN to the
final image set for classification.
In [19] they converted the first 784 bytes of various network traffic representations
into 28× 28 grey scale images to train a CNN to detect malicious network traffic and
different families of malicious network traffic. With their best preforming representa-
tion, their CNN achieved a 100% accuracy when distinguishing between malicious and
benign network traffic and a 98.65% accuracy when distinguishing between families
of malicious network traffic.
In [8], they were able to classify a data set containing both benign and malicious
binaries belonging to 12 different malware families by using a hybrid feed forward-
CNN classifier. The feed forward portion of the classifier used features extracted from
the PE meta data and imports while the CNN used opcode sequence data where each
row of the input volume corresponded to the one hot encoding of an opcode vector.
Their architecture was able to achieve a 0.92 f1-score, however the feed forward and
CNN alone were able to achieve a 0.90 and 0.91 f1-score respectively while an SVM
trained on the same features achieved a 0.92 f1-score, so these results serve more as
a proof of concept rather then indicating a superior solution.
As you can see there are various methods used to convert malware samples to
input for CNN classifiers. However one popular method put forward in [10] and used
in the following works is to convert the binaries to grey scale images by interpreting
the raw binary data as a sequence of pixels, where each byte represents the grey scale
value of its corresponding pixel in the range [0,255]. The problem with this process
is that the resulting images are not of uniform length, thus they must be reshaped in
order to match the input dimensions of the CNN classifier.
In [5], the authors used a CNN with alternating convolutional then subsampling
layers and several fully connected layers to classify a data set of grey scale images from
25 malware families. Here the input was rescaled to uniform dimensions, losing some
information. They also preform image augmentation such as rotation and shifting to
reduce overfitting. The resulting model managed to obtained a 94.5% accuracy when
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classifying malicious vs. benign samples.
The authors in [18] were able to classify malicious Internet of Things (IoT) mal-
ware by converting the binaries in a data set containing 365 samples to grey scale
images and then rescaling the images to uniform dimensions to train a CNN with.
Half of the samples were IoT malware belonging to two major IoT malware families,
and the other half were benign Ubuntu system files. The resulting classifier achieved
a 94% accuracy.
Transfer learning was used in [13] by taking the first 49 layers of the ResNet-
50 architecture and swapping the last layer for a 25-node softmax layer to make
classifications on a data set that contained grey scale images of 25 different families
of malware. The images were first converted to RGB since ResNet-50 is designed for
3-channel image input. During training all but the final layer weights were frozen and
the classifier was able to obtain an accuracy of 98.62%. Here, the varying size of the
malware binaries created varying sized images that were rescaled, still offering good
results despite the loss of information.
[3] also used transfer learning on the same data set as the above, except they
used the Inception-V1 architecture and froze all but the last fully connected layer
and the softmax layer which was replaced with a 25-node softmax layer. Similarly
they converted the grey scale images to RGB images by duplicating the grey scale
channel three times. Their approach obtained a very impressive 99.25% accuracy.
They also claim to provide an interpretation of the predictions by using LIME
[14] to highlight important areas of an input sample. However, the proposed method
can only highlight important regions of the input image called “super-pixels” which
encompass very many pixels which each map to a byte of code. The regions are of
varying size but there are 200 total, meaning that even a modestly sized binary of
200,000 Bytes would have super pixels highlighting on average 1000 bytes of code
each. We would like to improve on this approach in order to provide more granular
interpretations. Further, [3] also used their approach on the same data set used in
this chapter and obtained a 98.13% accuracy. We will return later to these results for
comparison between our methods.
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Additionally, [6] converts the same data set used in this chapter into grey scale
images and trains a CNN classifier without the use of transfer learning after down
sampling the images to unifrom size. The classifier has 3 convolutional layers followed
by a fully connected layer and a softmax classification layer and was able to achieve
a 97.5% accuracy. We will return also to these results for comparison between our
method with a trained from scratch method.
There has been a plethora of papers published with differing techniques used to
interpret or visualize what machine learning models and neural networks have learnt.
However, for the sake of brevity, we will discuss some of the techniques used for
convolutional neural networks only.
Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP), described in [2] as a set of constraints, is
used to visualize where the model is placing its emphasis when making classifications
by back propagating a models prediction using its weights and some decomposition
function which returns the relevance of previous nodes to that prediction. The con-
straints ensure that the total relevance is preserved from one layer to the next as well
as that the relevance of each node is equal to the sum of relevance contributions from
its input nodes which in turn is equal to the sum of relevance contributions to its
output nodes. Any decomposition function following these constraints is considered
a type of LRP.
In [17], they propose DeepLIFT which, in contrast to LRP, attributes to each node
a contribution to the difference in prediction from a reference prediction. DeepLIFT
back propagates just this relative difference in prediction scaled by the difference in
intermediate and initial inputs.
The authors in [14] put forward Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations
(LIME), which was used in [3] above, to explain predictions using an approach which
trains an interpretable classifier by heavily weighing samples nearer to a sample of in-
terest in order to locally approximate the non-interpretable or black-box model. This
work was extended by Tomi Peltola in [11] to generate local interpretable probabilis-
tic models by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the predictive model
and the interpretable model in order to provide explanations that account for model
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uncertainty.
There have also been several implementations of the above methods. The creators
of LIME developed a python library available at https://github.com/marcotcr/
lime. Additionaly, there is the iNNvestigate [1] python library available at https:
//github.com/albermax/innvestigate which was used in this chapter and provides
implementations of LRP as well as many other useful interpretation methods met for
convolutional neural networks, although many of them can be applied to other types
of neural networks not working with image data.
5.3 Method
Training and classification were done on a subset from a data set of 10,896 malware
files belonging to 9 different malware families.1 The data set is discussed in [15]. Each
sample consists of the hexadecimal representation of the malware’s binary content in a
.bytes file as well as its corresponding assembly code in an .asm file. The hexadecimal
representations were preprocessed as followed. First, we determined the total length
of each binary. Since our goal is to provide a fine grain interpretation, we wanted to
avoid resizing images to fit the input of the CNN if the resizing caused information
loss. Thus, we deiced to only scale up images by padding them with zeros, rather
then scaling them down. This is because when we scale down an image the resulting
image’s pixels will actually map to more then one pixel in the original, and therefore
more then one byte of code. Therefore, even if we obtain the importance of a single
pixel of the rescaled input image, we still do not have a fine grained approach, since
the mapping from rescaled input image to full sized image and then to the bytes and
finally the assembly code will be a one-to-many mapping, which is increasingly so
with large binaries that require more drastic rescaling. So, we picked a size range
where the majority of the binaries resided, that is the range of 101,400 to 200,934
bytes. The files which were less then 200,934 bytes in length were padded with bytes
of all 0’s before and after the binary so that all the binaries were the same size.
1The data set was downloaded from www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification/data
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The padding before and after the binaries was equal so that the actual binary was
centred vertically in the image, although it took up the entire width of the image.
The resulting data set contained 2,114 binaries with 6 classes total. The class details
are summed up in table 5.3.1.
Table 5.3.1: Class distribution in Data Set
Class No. Family Samples Type
1 Ramnit 635 Worm
2 Lollipop 68 Adware
4 Vundo 188 Trojan
6 Tracur 145 TrojanDownloader
8 Obfuscator.ACY 810 obfuscated malware
9 Gatak 268 Backdoor
Next, the binaries where converted into image tensors of the shape (183, 183, 6).
This was done by placing the first 6 bytes of the binary in the input tensor positions
at location (0,0,0) through (0,0,5) the next six bytes in the tensor positions at location
(0,1,0) through (0,1,5), and so on, until all the bytes were processed. The reason 6 was
chosen as the number of channels was because [12], which examined the effectiveness
of different lengths of byte-grams for malware classification, found that 6-byte-grams
were the most effective compared to other lengths of byte-grams. A byte-gram is as
a sequence of bytes which appear consecutively in a binary. These are analogous to
n-grams which are a sequence of n words or characters which appear in text. The
intuition here was that each pixel, which contains the 6-byte-gram in the pixel’s 6
channels, would contain what could be thought of as a “byte word” leaving the filters
to learn to detect significant byte words and in later layers significant sequences of
byte words.
To the best of our knowledge, this the first time someone has applied a CNN to a
malware binary classification task where the binaries were converted to “images” with
6 channels without the use of downsizing. The 6-channel input has an added benefit
of fitting more information into a smaller volume, this means we can have a compact
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input volume which can still contain all the information of a 200,934 byte binary,
therefore helping in our task of creating fine grain interpretations. The other two
dimensions were set to
√
200, 934÷ 6 = 183, since this created a square image, which
is what the models we are using for comparison (discussed in section 5.2) also used.
Figure 5.3.1 shows the resulting images of two samples for each of the 6 classes. The
images in the column labeled F are the first three channels of the samples interpreted
as RGB channels while the images in the columns labeled L are the last three channels
of the samples interpreted as RGB channels. As you can see there is some similarity
between images of the same classes and greater difference between images of different
classes. Additionally, there is a lot of similarity between the last and first three
channels. However, the CNN model is indifferent to the number of colour channels
or human detectable features and can find structure, imperceptible to humans, in an
arbitrary number of channels, therefore we must wait until the classification results
before we can draw any conclusions.
The neural network starts with 2 blocks of the classic convolution, ReLU, MaxPool
architecture. This architecture was chosen as it has been shown to work well in the
literature and is also similar to what was used by the models used for comparison.
We went with just 2 blocks as we wanted to limit the number of parameters given the
small size of our data set. These 2 blocks were followed by a single fully connected
layer with 512 neurons with the ReLU activation function then a softmax classification
layer with 6 neurons. 512 neurons were used as experimentation showed this number
to work best on the validation set despite adding a large number of parameters and the
possibility of over fitting. The two convolutional layers used 128, then 256, 5x5 filters
with strides of 2 and the MaxPool layers used 2x2 pool size with strides of 2. This was
done mainly because the small data set size meant we had to shrink the volume as fast
as possible in order not have too many layers or too many neurons in the last volume
before the first dense layer thus keeping the number of parameters low. To reduce over
fitting dropout with a rate of 0.4 was also used on the connections between the last
MaxPool layer and the first fully connected layer since these connections accounted
for 13,107,712 of the 13,949,575 trainable parameters. Further, L2 regularization was
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Fig. 5.3.1: Images from two samples from each of the 6 classes. Images in columns
labeled F are the first three channels of the samples interpreted as RGBchannels while
the images in columns labeled L are the last three channels
used with a 0.1 penalty on both convolutional layer weights and the weights between
the last MaxPool layer and the first fully connected layer. Figure 5.3.2 shows a
summary of the architecture of the CNN used. The figure was created using software
available online at http://alexlenail.me/NN-SVG/LeNet.html which is described
in [9].
Fig. 5.3.2: Model Architecture
The model was trained as follows. First the data set of 2,114 samples was randomly
split into 3 disjoint sets, the training set, validation set, and the test set, each with
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approximately the same class distribution. The Training set had 1,514 samples, the
validation set 100 samples, and the test set had 500 samples. The validation set was
used to tune the model’s hyper parameters and needed to be small to ensure the test
set was large enough to be significant for evaluation while the training set was large
enough for the model to learn generalized patterns despite the small size of the total
data set. The test set was not used except at the end of training in order to evaluate
the final model. The training was done using the Adam optimizer with 256 batch
size over 80 epochs. Classes were weighted inversely proportionately to the class size
in order to account for class imbalances. The model was implemented and trained
using the Keras [4] python library.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Evaluation of Our Model
After training the model and using the weights with the lowest validation loss over the
80 epochs the model obtained a 98.1% balanced categorical accuracy and a 0.237595
categorical crossentropy loss on the left out test set. Balanced accuracy was used since
there was a class imbalance in the data set. Further, the model does not seem to suffer
from over fitted as indicated in figure 5.4.1 which shows the test and validation loss
history plotted against the number of epochs. This is also evident from figure 5.4.2
which shows the test and validation categorical accuracy plotted against the number
of epochs.
5.4.2 Interpretation
After training, a process called Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) [2], which
returns the relevances of all input nodes to a sample’s prediction, was used to find
important input pixels. In our experiment we used the iNNvestigate [1] python li-
brary’s LRP implementation. Once we had the relevances of each input node we
averaged them across the 6 channels to get a 2D relevance map. For visualization,
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Fig. 5.4.1: Test and Validation Loss History
Fig. 5.4.2: Test and Validation Balanced Categorical Accuracy History
we used the seismic colour map from matplotlib [7] to plot the relevance map. Figure
5.4.3 shows the image resulting from taking the first 3 channels of the sample associ-
ated with the binary with ID 0AnoOZDNbPXIr2MRBSCJ, and the image resulting
from taking the last 3 channels of the same sample, as well as its corresponding
relevance map. The pixels highlighted with red contributed positively to the mod-
els prediction while the pixels highlighted in blue contributed negatively. Sample
0AnoOZDNbPXIr2MRBSCJ was correctly classified by our model with a 99.99%
chance of belonging to class 1.
Although we cannot obtain a lot of specific information by looking at these images
and the LRP visualization, we can still obtain some broad insight into the models
prediction. As you can see from figure 5.4.3, the classifier recognized a large set
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Fig. 5.4.3: 0AnoOZDNbPXIr2MRBSCJ Relevance Map
of pixels as an indication that this sample belonged to class 1. Further, there was
still some pixels which contributed negatively to this prediction, mostly in the upper
portion of the image above the band of white which corresponds with bytes of 0’s.
This suggest that the portion of the code containing functionality related to class 1 in
located in the lower portion of the binary and the upper portion is mostly related to
other classes or is benign. However, these statements are always dependent on how
well the classifier was trained to learn relevant information. Further, if the relevance
was intensely focused on a few small areas we could be worried that the model is
relying on a small set of features to make classifications, meaning small changes could
lead to misclassifications, and this can be taken advantage of by malware authors.
To obtain a fine grained interpretation such as highlighting specific lines of code,
we obtain a list of indices of the input pixels sorted by their relevance. We then move
down the list in descending order of relevance and obtain the most relevant 6-grams
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Fig. 5.4.4: Terminal output when working backwards from the relevant 6-grams to
the code snippets
for interpretation first. The relevant 6-gram’s position in the sample’s input tensor,
the input tensor itself, and the corresponding byte file are needed to determine the
6-gram’s address in the assembly code. These are needed to determine the amount
of padding to account for, as well as the starting address in the byte file, since they
don’t all start at the same number. However, in a application scenario all of this
information would be available. Once we have the exact address in the assembly
code it is a trivial task to find the lines of Assembly code which contain the relevant
6-gram.
It should be noted that finding the exact lines of code which contributed to a
prediction, as well as their exact ordering relative to the size of their contribution, is
very difficult, if not impossible with most other model architectures. For example, if
n-gram analysis was used, where the presence or frequency of an n-gram is used as
a feature, then even though we may have the contribution of each n-gram feature,
we do not know which occurrence of said n-gram in the binary contributed the most.
This is true in some way for most frequency based techniques. Further, for other
CNN based techniques, we have the problem of rescaling causing the contribution of
one input node being distributed across many pixels in the original image. It is only
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when positional information of each 6-gram is maintained from raw binary to input
tensor, as we have done so here, where we are able to so easily make such precise
interpretations of the model.
Figure 5.4.4 shows the terminal output when working backwards from the relevant
6-grams to the code snippets in the assembly code. Note that some of the assembly
code has been truncated so we could not find the corresponding code snippets to
many of the most significant 6-grams but we have done so for the 100th and 122nd
most significant. This is not a problem however as typically you would have the full
assembly code.
The significance of finding these code snippets which contributed heavily to a
prediction is large. For example, there is the case where the code snippets are com-
pletely irrelevant to classifying binaries according to functionality despite the model
achieving good classification results. In this situation, there is the likely culprit of an
incomplete or non-representative data set. It could be that one class has irrelevant
but frequently occurring code-snippets that by chance do not appear in the other
classes. Here, gathering a larger data set, or even augmenting the current data set
so that other classes also include this irrelevant code snippet, can force the model
to learn different patterns that exclude this irrelevant feature, which should also im-
prove generalization performance. If the classification performance drops after this,
then this could hint at poor feature engineering, since the remaining representative
features no longer help the model make predictions. In the case of CNNs applied to
images of binaries, this could mean a deeper model architecture that can create more
abstract hidden features might be needed, or that the representation of binaries as
images themselves is unhelpful.
In the case where code snippets with high relevances to the model’s predictions
are known to be relevant to classifying binaries based off their functionality, then the
results of the model are in a way, validated. As we said earlier, this can help malware
analysts as they can be shown where to start their static analysis, as well as help
stakeholders feel confident in the black-box CNN model.
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5.4.3 Comparison With Other Models
Table 5.4.1 shows the confusion matrix of our model on the left out test set where
we can see the model preformed well for all classes. Table 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 show the
confusion matrix of the models used in [3] and [6] respectively (both are discussed in
section 5.2). The columns and rows for classes 3, 5, and 7, which were not used in
our experiment, have been omitted.
Table 5.4.1: Confusion Matrix for Our Model on the Left Out Test Set
Class No. 1 2 4 6 8 9
1 149 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 16 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 44 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 32 1 1
8 2 0 0 0 190 0
9 1 0 0 0 0 62
Table 5.4.2: Confusion Matrix for Model used in [3]*
Class No. 1 2 4 6 8 9
1 154 0 0 0 3 0
2 0 238 0 0 3 1
4 1 0 33 1 0 0
6 1 0 0 63 1 0
8 2 0 0 0 119 0
9 0 4 0 0 0 102
*columns and rows of classes classes
3,5, and 7 have been omitted
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Table 5.4.3: Confusion Matrix for Model used in [6]*
Class No. 1 2 4 6 8 9
1 1490 4 2 9 28 3
2 6 2440 0 7 8 16
4 3 0 461 1 3 2
6 8 6 2 713 10 9
8 44 4 8 17 1138 8
9 2 2 0 6 5 996
*columns and rows of classes classes
3,5, and 7 have been omitted
Using these confusion matrices to calculate the balanced accuracy score of each
model, we can get a decent comparison. However, the reader should note that the
other models were trained on more classes and with much more training data so
these are not perfect direct comparisons of our approaches. Table 5.4.4 sums up the
comparisons between the three models. As you can see, we score competitive balanced
accuracy score with a very light weight model. Further, we are able to give a fine
grained analysis of our predictions using the method detailed in section 5.4.2 and this
method cannot be easily applied to the other models without added processing and
sacrificing the preciseness of our method. This is due the decision to not rescale the
images, meaning we can map one relevant input node to exactly one 6-gram in the
binary and then to the corresponding assembly code.
Our model does have draw backs however. Unlike the other models ours is only
designed to work with samples in a specific size range and therefore one would need
multiple models in order to achieve the same effect across different size ranges. One
possible solution would be to train on a data set where the samples in the appropriate
size range are not rescaled but padded like we did here, and the images which are too
large are rescaled to fit. This however would mean the interpretation method would
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only maintain its fine granularity when classifying samples which were not resized.
Table 5.4.4: Model Comparisons
Model Balanced Acc. Size
Our Model 98.1% 2 conv, 1 Dense
Model from 97.04%* 20+ layers
[3] see [16]
Model from 96.8%* 3 conv, 1 Dense
[6]
Model Interpretation Sample Size
Our Model Fine grained & 104k-200k Bytes
precise
Model from Broad & any size
[3] imprecise
Model from none given any size
[6]
*calculated by omitting columns and rows
of confusion matrix for classes 3,5, and 7
5.5 Conclusion
In summary, we were able to obtain competitive classification results on a subset of a
classic benchmark data set. Compared to other methods we made appropriate trade
offs in terms of broad applicability of our model (in that it only works for malware
in a specific size range) in return for large gains in interpretability. We thus have
provided a proof of concept for 6-channel image based malware classification using
a simple convolutional neural network that did not suffer from excessive overfitting
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despite a small data set. To the best of our knowledge, this the first time someone
has been able to interpret a CNN based malware detector with the granularity which
has been achieved here, by applying CNNs to a malware converted to images with
more then a single channel in order to avoid rescaling of the image and information
loss.
For future work, there is much work to be done in order to better handle binaries of
different sizes. If more sophisticated approaches for dealing with binaries of different
sizes are implemented, which do not result in information loss, then fine grained
interpretations, in the manner we have done so here, can be possible for any malware
file. Further, the data set will not shrink as a result of not considering files which are
too large. This means more advanced models can be deployed without over fitting
the data set, potentially increasing the models performance.
Another interesting possibility is to explore is the application of our approach to
graph convolutional neural networks (GCNNs), which are CNNs applied to graph
representations, trained on malware classification. It is a popular approach in mal-
ware analysis to represent the behaviour or other features of a malware binary in a
graph which in many cases will contain direct and explicit functional information.
If a GCNN is trained on a dataset where each sample is one of these graph repre-
sentations of a malware binary, then less time can be spent worrying about weather
the model learnt to use features indicative of functionality and translating those fea-
tures to functionality afterward for interpretation. Instead interpretability can be
used to directly make statements about the relevant functionality which the model is
perceiving within the sample to make its prediction.
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In malware detection a misclassification can cause huge delays if a benign file which is
needed for some time sensitive task is flagged as malicious. Furthermore, there is the
risk that a malicious file is permitted to execute causing unforeseen damage to the
users system. Since a small to large business may encounter thousands to millions
of benign files each day, a hard requirement of malware detection systems relied
upon by large companies is a low false positive rate (FPR). Due to the large volume
of files, even a FPR of one in a thousand would lead to daily stoppages and false
alarms. Furthermore, any fragility in the models accuracy can be taken advantage
of by malware authors looking to bypass detection. It is clear that misclassification
in this scenario carries a heavy risk and to quantify the rate of misclassification,
metrics such as FPR or accuracy are typically used. However, these metrics do not
capture the full story when trying to convey how robust a detection system is to the
anti detection efforts of malware authors. A contrived example would be a model
that learnt to associate a few superficial features strongly with the property of being
benign but none the less has high accuracies on held out test sets. Here, superficial is
taken to mean that the features are not actually indicative of being benign but due
to peculiarities in the model’s training set, the model treats them as such. In such
a case, if a malware author was to learn of this association, they could easily change
102
6. ROBUSTNESS METRIC
their binaries to bypass the detection system, without having to change the malicious
functionality of their malware. This means that despite the high accuracy, the model
is still not robust to anti detection efforts.
A metric that better illustrates the robustness of a classification model is needed.
This metric should quantify the accuracy in relation to the number of features which
are no longer following the model’s learnt relationships. This is because we want to
measure how well the model preforms as features are made to no longer have their
expected values given a samples actual class and thus no longer aid in prediction. In
this chapter we refer to such features as “deactivated”. Further, the metric should be
concerned only with the inputs and outputs of the model. This allows the model to
be treated as a black box so that the metric can be applied to any model, that is the
metric will be model agnostic. Additionally, the metric should have some degree of
customization. This is because not all models are the same. They use different types
of features with different valid feature ranges and are applied in varying domains.
This means that what it is for a feature to be ”deactivated” will be largely different
among different applications and scenarios and therefore will have to be determined
and asserted by the user of the metric. Further, the technique for calculating the
metric should allow the user to determine which set of features deactivation caused
the accuracy to drop below some minimum performance requirement. This follows
from the fact that not all models use the same features, thus a model may only need
a few features to be deactivated for its performance to drop significantly, however if
the features use by that model are harder to change without removing the malicious
properties of the malware, then this model is still robust.
In this chapter we propose a new robustness metric inspired by area under curve
(AUC) which meets these requirements. We start with a discussion of how the metric
is calculated and why the metric is calculated in this way. We then use the metric on
several classification models that have been trained on a data set of features extracted
from benign and malicious binaries. Finally we end with a discussion of our results
and possible future work.
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6.2 The Robustness Metric
The metric is calculated as follows. First, a numerical measure of feature significance
must be found for each feature. For different models this means different things. In
the case of a logistic or linear regression classifier, the feature significances is equal to
the coefficient or weight of the feature. For decision trees and random forest it is the
gini importance and average gini importance among the constituent trees respectively.
In the case of neural networks we use layer-wise relevance propagation [1] to obtain the
relevance of each input node for each sample. We then average the absolute value of
these relevances in order to get the average relevance of each node. This value is used
as the feature significance of the node’s corresponding feature. The average absolute
value is used because for one sample a node may have a large negative contribution
and for another sample, a large positive contribution. If the actual relevance value
is used, then during averaging these relevances will cancel out despite the associated
feature having a large effect on both predictions. For other models there are typically
already standard accepted practices for obtaining a feature’s significance but in the
case that there is not, a method known as permutation importance [2] can be used.
In this case, classification on a set of samples is done before and after a feature is
permuted. The increase in error is what determines the importance of said feature.
After the feature significance is found, the model’s balanced accuracy on a test set
is found. A test set is used for the same reason you do not report a models accuracy
on the training set. Balanced accuracy is used because it is calculated by taking the
weighted average accuracy for each class, where the weights are inversely proportion-
ate to the class frequency. This means that a random classifier is expected to get 50%
balanced accuracy even on imbalanced data sets. This allows for direct comparison
of the robustness metric when evaluated on test sets with varying class distributions.
Next the most significant feature is deactivated and the balanced accuracy with re-
spect to the same test set is determined again. This process is repeated, deactivating
the next most significant feature each time. The features are deactivated in order
of significance because if a feature is not very important then we are not interested
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in how well the model preforms after its deactivation since a good performance after
removing irrelevant information is not surprising or noteworthy. The way in which
features are deactivated is discussed at the end of this section.
After this we have a list of balanced accuracies {a0, a2, ..., an−1} where ak is the
balanced accuracy of the model when the k most significant features are deactivated.
We then plot these accuracies along the y-axis with the number of deactivated features
on the x-axis to obtain a curve. After this, we take the area under the curve and we
divide it by the number of features there are, then subtract 0.5 and multiply it by 2.
The result is the value of the robustness metric.
The area is taken because it captures the total accuracy across each iteration of
deactivating a feature then evaluating the model. The area is divided by the number
of features because the balanced accuracy, which is on the y-axis, is always between
0 and 1. Thus, if the area is taken between 0 and the number of features, n, then
the area is always between 0 × n and 1 × n. So dividing by n means the area is
scaled between 0 and 1. The scaled area is corrected by subtracting 0.5 because
a random classifier is expected to have a 0.5 accuracy thus half of the area is not
actually attributable to the model. In some rare cases the balanced accuracy may dip
below 0.5 enough that the scaled area is below 0.5, meaning the corrected scaled area
would be negative. In this case, the scaled corrected area is set to 0. This means that
the scaled and corrected area is now in between 0 and 0.5, so it is then multiplied by
2 so that it is between 0 and 1, giving us our final robustness value.
For deactivating features there are several possible methods. A naive approach,
hence referred to as the zeros method, would be to set the feature’s values to 0. How-
ever, this may not correspond to a realistic value for all features and can therefore
give untrustworthy results. Another approach, which we will refer to as the random
permutation method, would be to randomly permute the feature column. This ap-
proach is inspired by the permutation importance method discussed early. Another
approach could be to use a reference sample and set deactivated features equal to
the corresponding feature value in the reference sample. The reference sample can be
hand picked to be an average of some class of interest or some other value. We will
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hence forth refer to this method as the reference method.
This gives the user of the metric a good way of customizing it for their specific
use case. For example they may have a mix of binary features and numerical features
and they may want to set the binary features to 0 and the numerical features to their
average value when deactivating them. In any case the user can define exactly how
each specific feature is deactivated rather then doing the same for all of them. In the
following section, we test all three of these approaches. The reference sample is set to
be the average of the benign class. This was done because we are typically concerned
with detecting malicious samples when classifying binaries, so setting a feature to
its average value within the benign class would isolate the effect that the remaining
features had on obtaining a malicious classification.
The reader should note that sometimes we are more concerned with FPR as appose
to accuracy. In this case one can replace the balanced accuracy at each step with the
FPR and get a similar robustness metric which is conditioned on FPR rather then
accuracy. The same is true for other accuracy like metrics as well.
6.3 Method
In our experiment we first trained a neural network, a decision tree, random forest,
and a logistic regression model on a data set containing 77 features extracted from
malicious and benign binaries. The data set contained 14599 malicious samples and
5012 benign ones. The data set was split into a train and test set containing 17649
and 1962 samples respectively, with equal class distributions. The features were also
all scaled using min-max scaling. The neural network had 77 input nodes, two hidden
layers with 100 and 30 nodes respectively, and an output layer with 2 nodes, one for
each class. Once the training was complete, the models were evaluated on a test
set. The neural network obtained a balanced accuracy of 96.16%, the random forest
a balanced accuracy of 98.44%, the decision tree 98.26% and the logistic regression
model a balanced accuracy of 94.10%. Next we obtained the robustness metric for the
four models using the process detailed in section 6.2, using the test set to determine
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the balanced accuracy at each step. Table 6.3.1 shows the results.
Table 6.3.1: Robustness Metrics For Trained Models
Model Zeros Rand. Perm. Ref. Sample
Neural Network 0.1236 0.0896 0.0973
Random Forest 0.0499 0.0779 0.0880
Decision Tree 0.0543 0.0546 0.0798
Logistic Reg. 0.0000 0.0519 0.0279
As shown, the neural network consistently out preforms the other models in terms
of robustness regardless of which method is used for deactivating the features. This is
expected since the neural network has 130 intermediate nodes across two layers each of
which can learn a different relationship between the features and the predicted value.
This means that if a feature is deactivated, then the nodes which learnt relationships
not relying on said feature can still produce correct predictions.
The random forest got second except for in the case of the zeros method where
it got third. This makes sense as the random forest has many different constituent
classifiers and much like the neural network, when one feature is deactivated, the
trees that do not rely on that feature can produce a correct prediction. In the case of
both the random forest and neural networks, redundancies were able to provide more
robustness, as expected.
The decision tree got third except for in the case of the zeros method where it
got second. Further, the logistic regression classifier consistently got last. This is
to be expected as the logistic regression classifier simply takes the sigmoid of the
features weighted sum and in has no redundancies to deal with misbehaving features
which are heavily weighted. Further, the decision tree only has a single path from
the root to each of its leaves and thus cannot correct if the prediction is lead askew
by misbehaving features.
The resulting plots when finding the robustness measures are shown in figure 6.3.1
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in which you can see the zeros method was much less stable with many spikes in per-
formance which may be misleading as these spikes are the effects of highly unrealistic
feature values. This is the suspected reason the random forest obtained worse robust-
ness using the zeros method. The other methods were much more stable with a steady
decline and are therefore the recommended choice. The random permutation method
can be used to test the models robustness against random chance while the reference
method can be used to test its robustness against samples intentionally designed to
be misleading, such as adversarial malware.
Fig. 6.3.1: Robustness plots with balanced accuracy on the y-axis and number of




In summary, we were able to define an effective algorithm for calculating a robustness
metric which met our stated requirements in section 6.1. That is, the metric is defined
in terms of deactivated features, it is model-agnostic as it is only concerned with the
inputs and outputs of the model, and it can be customized, meaning it can be used
meaningfully with many different models, feature types, and use cases. Additionally
it is always between 0 and 1 with 0 representing the negative extreme of a random
classifier that always scores 50% balanced accuracy and 1 representing the positive
extreme of am omniscient classifier that makes perfect classifications, even with no
input. Further more, it automatically accounts for class imbalances with the use of
balanced accuracy.
Our results also validated our approach since the models which are typically as-
sociated with indifference to small changes in input (Neural Network and Random
Forest), and who have theoretical support for higher robustness through the redun-
dancy present in their design, scored better then those which are typically sensitive
to small changes in input (Decision Tree and Logistic Regression).
For future work, experiments with multi-class models can be conducted. The same
method may work for models which return a single set of feature significances even
in the multi-class case, such as decision trees, random forests, and neural networks.
However in the case of logistic regression, there are a separate set of feature signifi-
cances for each class if it is a one-vs-rest scheme. In this case it is not obvious if it
is better to average the feature significances to determine which order to deactivate
the features, or to produce a robustness score for each binary classifier, and then
average these robustness scores. Lastly, a similar method needs to be implemented
for regression models, ideally one whose value can be directly compared to the value
of the robustness metric defined here. Potentially a plot of the mean squared error
(instead of accuracy) the classifier achieves on the test set as features are deactivated
could be used. In this case a smaller area under the plot would be ideal, as this would
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The work presented in this thesis provided a exploratory overview of machine learn-
ing interpretability in the malware detection domain. Starting with Chapter 1, a
brief overview of machine learning and some of the popular algorithms therein was
provided, as well as an introduction to machine learning interpretability.
In Chapter 2, a literature review concerning the application of machine learning
to malware analysis was provided, as well as a discussion of the current strengths
and weakness of the machine learning based malware detection approaches in their
present state. Emerging threats in the malware domain were discussed, such as fileless
malware and unconventional computing paradigms, as well as the practical challenges
for machine learning based malware detectors, namely, the cost of training detectors,
adversarial malware, and detector interpretability. Lastly, a discussion of possible
solutions to these issues was also presented.
In Chapter 3, a Proof of Concept fileless malware, JSLess, was described thor-
oughly, then implemented, and finally tested against various malware detection soft-
ware in order to showcase the severity of the threat posed by fileless malware and
the necessity for machine learning based malware detectors in the present day. For
future work, the functionality for JSLess can be extended, an approach for detecting
malware similar to JSLesss can be researched, and the threat of fileless malware in
unconventional computing paradigms can be explored.
In Chapter 4, we provided a description of interpretability goals for machine
learning based malware detectors and presented techniques for achieving these inter-
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pretability goals for detectors which leverage n-gram analysis and some of the most
popular classification algorithms, namely; Logistic Regression, Random Forest, and
Neural Networks. The stated interpretability goals were robustness, improving stake-
holder confidence in the detector, and helping malware analysts with downstream
tasks. A suggestion for future work is the specification of interpretation techniques
for other machine learning algorithms or different feature sets.
In Chapter 5, a novel approach for providing fine a grain interpretation of malware
detectors which leverage Convolutional Neural Networks was provided. The approach
was able to out preform other similar methods in the literature while providing far
better interpretations. The downside however was the technique was only usable on
malware binaries within a certain size range. A technique which applies to binaries
of any size is an objective for future research
In Chapter 6 we gave a novel approach for summarizing the robustness of a sin-
gle binary classifier in a single metric. The binary classification case is common in
the malware detection domain where models often classify samples as malicious or
benign, however more work needs to be done on applying the metric to multi-class
classification as well as regression tasks. This is necessary because as we have seen in
Chapters 4 and 5, we are often interested in classifying malware by class as well.
Although machine learning has progressed greatly in the last decade or so, and
despite the interest it generates for various high risk applications, including in cyber
security, it is still a work in progress and there are many unsolved issues machine
learning researchers face. The issue of interpretability is a complex one with no
simple “one size fits all” solution. Even within the malware detection domain, inter-
pretability solutions still differ largely from one model to the next. In this thesis we
presented a step in the right direction but there is still much work to be done, in both
making machine learning models interpretable and in making them practical for large
scale cyber security applications. It is the authors hope that the discussion provided
here is informative to the reader and helps them too form their own opinions about
interpretability, inspires their own interpretability solutions, and in the end, helps
machine learning based malware detectors play an essential role in cyber security.
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